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Abstract
The future of the privatization of wastewater systems in Brazil will be decided in the next
few years. The use of innovative technologies, such as Chemically Enhanced Primary
Treatment (CEPT), will only be possible with private participation in future concessions
of wastewater system. This thesis describes the possible savings of using CEPT for the
upgrading of a wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) in Tatui, Brazil, through
concessions. It is shown that the appropriate implementation of Tatui's WWTP with
private participation will only be feasible with the creation of an effective regulatory
framework and specific federal allocation of responsibilities for the water services.
The study contrasts the present legal background regarding privatization of water services
and the expected policy requirements. To examine the CEPT upgrading alternatives for
Tatui, costs are compared and the investment is analyzed in a concession scenario using
several financial criteria.
It has been found that although CEPT could be an effective solution to the WWTP
design, private participation still involves high investment risk. This thesis also describes
the next steps for the transition from state administration of water services to
municipal/private implementation, management and operation.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
The purpose of this theses is to present Chemical Enhanced Primary Treatment (CEPT)
as an effective mean to upgrade lagoon treatment systems, specifically when applied
through a concession of the wastewater treatment plant of growing municipalities. To
accomplish it, an overview of the present situation of the water and sanitation sector, and
an analysis of the regulatory framework of Brazil privatization process is described. The
history and case studies of concession in the Country are presented as a mean to
compare public and private administration of water services. Besides the required policy
regulation for a successful concession of water and wastewater system, the financial
analyzes of three upgrading alternatives for Tatui City's overloaded wastewater
treatment plant is presented. This financial analysis relies on the comparison of some
investment parameters: present value, payback period, benefit-cost ratio and internal rate
of return. The result is a regulation framework and a cheaper budget for Tatui's
concession using CEPT.
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Chapter 2 - Brazil Background
National Characteristics
In terms of land area, Brazil is the biggest country in South America and the fifth largest
in the world. It has the tenth GNP in the world. The population of Brazil is around 160
million inhabitants, ten percent located in the Greater Sio Paulo area.
The country is divided in five Macro Regions: North, Northeast, South, Southeast, and
Midwest. The cultural, economic and social differences between these Regions are huge.
Whereas the Northeast Region is the poorest in sanitation and water services, the South
and Southeast Regions are the most developed. The greatest urban population densities
occur in Southeast cities such as Sio Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, in this study
of the water and sanitation condition in Brazil I will present comparisons between
Southeast and Northeast Regions as examples of statistic ranges in the Country.
In Brazil 31.5 million households are located in urban areas and 7.5 in rural areas
(Gazeta Mercantil, 1998). The deficit in water and especially sanitation services in
Brazil is mainly related to the migration of consumers from rural areas to the cities.
From 1960 until 1990, the number of city households increased by 20 million while in
the rural areas, the increase was only 400 thousand.
-Water and Sanitation
It is important to notice that in most of the Brazilian Regions water problems are mainly
related to sanitation and quality of service not scarcity, therefore, the number of
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connection to water supply is related to public health and regional development. Table
2-1 shows the significant difference between urban and rural connections to water
supply in Brazil
Table 2-1: Urban and rural connections to water supply in Brazil
Water Supply (1995) Urban Areas Rural Areas Total
Connected to the network 90,4% 16,6% 76,2%
Other 9,6% 83,4% 23,8%
Source: FIBGE, PNAD (1995), And "Panorama Setorial" (Sectorial Panorama)
Regarding the evolution of water connections in the Country, despite the great increase
in urban connections, it still cannot supply the population growth and migration. Table
2-2 shows how the percentage of connections evolved in the last few decades.
Table 2-2: Evolution of Water Connections in Urban Areas
Source: FIBGE, PNAD (1995), And "Panorama Setorial" (Sectorial Panorama)
As mentioned before, the distribution of water services varies per region. Table 2-3
represents the two extremes of the connection percentage.
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Table 2-3: Number of Connections per Region
Source: PNAD (1993/955), And "Panorama Setorial" (Sectorial Panorama)
As presented in Table 2-4, another characteristic of the variety of level of consumers in
the country is the percentage of households with one tap (yard tap)
Table 2-4: Percentages of connections to yard tap in different Regions
1995 Northeast Southeast
Total Percentage of connection 59.84 87.56
Connections to yard tap from the total 51.14 84.30
Source: PNAD (1993/955), And "Panorama Setorial" (Sectorial Panorama)
An important difference in water services for the Southeast and the Northeast is the
percentage of connections in the city core compared to the suburb area. In some cities in
the Northeast region the ratio between suburb and city connection can be 0.50 while in
the Southeast region it is in the range of 0.75 to 0.91.
Sanitation
Despite the increase in sewage collection in Brazil in the last few years, the percentage
of wastewater collection is lower than 40%. Table 2-5 shows the national variation as
12
well as the average.
Table 2-5: Sewage Collection
Region 1993 1995
Northeast 5,64% 5,11%
Southeast 66,31% 69,58%
Brazil 38,66% 39,54%
Source: FIBGE, PNAD (1995), And "Panorama Setorial" (Sectorial Panorama)
Unfortunately, sewage collection percentage is not related to wastewater treatment. In
most cities, less than 10% of the wastewater collected is treated.
Health in Brazil
Studies show that investments between US$1 and US$4 in water and sanitation can save
from US$4 to US$10 in health care (Gazeta Mercantil, 1998). Brazil 58 nation in the
World Ranking for Quality of Life (UN) .One percent of improvement in water and
sanitation for low income population reduces more than 6% in child mortality
(Environmental Engineering Congress 1997, IPEA). Almost two thirds of
hospitalizations in Brazil are of children under 10 years old with diseases related to
water. Ten million Brazilians are presently infected with schistosomiases.
Child mortality is one of the most important parameters for the evaluation of water and
sanitary services in developing countries. Table 2-6 shows the reduction of child
mortality in the last few decades in absolute values.
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Table 2-6 Child Mortality Rate (per 1000)
Region 1960/70 1994
Northeast 151,18 63,10
Southeast 100,24 26,40
Brazil 116,94 40,00
Source: Inquiry and Research Directory FLBGE, PNAD (1995), And "Panorama Setorial" (Sectorial Panorama)
Table 2-7 presents the percentage of child mortality due to inadequate water condition,
and inadequate water and sanitation condition.
Table 2-7 Child Mortality due to Sanitary Conditions (1985/90)
Adequate Service of Inadequate Service of
Region Water & Sanitary Water & Sanitary Sanitary only
Northeast 20,3% 89,6% 51,9%
Southeast 23,2% 50,8% 49,9%
Brazil 21,9% 59,1% 38,1%
Source: "Diagnostico do Setor Saneamento," (Sanitary Sector Diagnosis) PMSS series, Vol. 7 , Elaborated by IPEA/CPS,
and "Panorama Setorial" (Sectorial Panorama)
History of Sanitation in Brazil
In the beginning of 19 th century water was supplied through springs and sewage was
collected in tanks in some cities. Around 1830 fountains were installed in the center of
main cities. At that time water vending was very common, it was sold in thirty
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liters jars called "barrilote" in the main cities for the health of consumers. In the last two
decades of the nineteenth century, epidemic diseases infected major cities especially
during summer and autumn. It was the beginning of federal investments in
infrastructure. As a result, in 1900 the first federal environmental companies were
created. Meanwhile, in the beginning of the century, population growth and urban
migration increased the importance of small municipalities.
During the Second World War, USA made the first international investment in
infrastructure through the Public Health Special Service (SESP). This investment
focused in Brazilian regions where military supplies were being produced for the USA
(for example: rubber, quartz, mica). Since then, many other international loans started
financing sanitary projects through international banks and agencies (for instance,
Interamerican Development Bank, USAID and UNICEF). In 1964, after the military
coup, the Nation started a centralization process that lasted for more than two decades.
During the military dictatorship, all national and international investments had to be
made through the federal government. By that time, a sequence of several governmental
organizations and foundations were being created, restructured and inactivated,
replacing and reorganizing the water service financing system. The most important
governmental financing organ created was the Sanitary National Plan (Planasa), in 1969.
Planasa's main responsibility was to create sanitary state companies in order to organize
the allocation of loans. During the turning of the decade, Planasa had already set up and
invested in 238 municipalities and created 27 State Environmental Agencies (Cesbs),
which are still in existence today. From 1980 to 1990, the Brazilian ec.onomy went
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through its worst period. During that decade, the average income per capita has
decreased 0,4% (Silva, 1996) slowing down the pace of the water and sanitary
development.
Most of the concession agreements granted to Cesbs in the 1970's are about to expire in
the next few years. After the concession period, municipalities will have to decide
whether to administer their own water system or privatize it. The privatization of water
systems in Brazil is made through bids in which any appropriate company, national or
international, private or public, can participate.
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Chapter 3 - Administration Structure and Legislation
Organization of the Water and Sanitation Sector
The history of the water and sanitation sector in Brazil is recent. The sector evolution
can be grouped in four stages, some of which overlapping others. During the first stage
of development (from the Second World War until 1965), foreign companies were
funding sanitary projects. The second stage occurred as a result of the dictatorship
(around 1965/70) when the centralization and national security were principles, it was
the federal intervention stage. The third was the decentralization stage when the
administration of the water services returned to the municipalities (1970/80). Finally, the
fourth stage represented the consolidation of a state administration structure responsible
for the management of the water services (from 1980/85). The present set-up is the
result of this evolution of administration structure. The three resulting models of
administration of water services from this evolution of administration structure over the
past 60 years follow. Non-Governmental Organization administrations are not
considered as a model of service since in Brazil they are used only in few small
communities.
State Environmental Companies (Cesbs)
This is the most important model of water and sanitation administration in Brazil.
Around 1970, twenty seven state environmental agencies , "Companhias Estaduais de
Saneamento Basico" (Cesbs,), were created in order to make local investments in water
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and sanitation. Now some of them are among the biggest companies in the sector
invoicing annually between US$ 1 and 2 B (for example: Cedae, the agency from Rio de
Janeiro, Sabesp, the agency from Sap Paulo, etc.). Regarding their services, they have
the concession for the operation, maintenance, management, construction, upgrading
and commercialization of water and wastewater services in their respective states or
regions. The concession period is approximately 20 to 25 years. Regarding their
autonomy, the Cesbs can make investments and participate in bids according to their
own planning program. They can raise international funds directly and define tariffs.
Presently, around 3.7 thousand municipalities (70%) have their water system
concession managed by Cesbs. Almost ten percent of these municipalities are serviced
by the "Servico de Abastecimento do Estado de Sio Paulo" (Sabesp), the Sio Paulo
State Environmental Company. Sabesp is the biggest environmental company in South
America. Its expenditure for 1995 was around US$ 2 B.. Sabesp has 18 thousand
employees and provides service for 20 million customers. Municipal Management and
Operation with FNS Financial Support
This is the administration model of water and wastewater service providing for almost
30% of the municipalities in the Country. In this model there is a partnership between
the municipality and the "Fundacao Nacional de Saude" (FNS) National Health
Foundation, The local authority is responsible for the administration and operation of the
water and wastewater system while the FNS provides investments and stipulates tariffs.
This model created the Autonomous Water and Sewer Municipal Service (Saae's,
"Servco Autonomo de Aguas e Esgoto") to act as the local water and sanitary agencies.
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Municipal Services
In this model, the operation and maintenance of water and sanitation services are done
either directly by the municipal government or by autonomous agencies. The
administration must provide funds for structural investments through specific federal or
state loans, and through their municipal budget. This model of administration is not in
use anymore.
Financing
The main differences between the two present models of public administration of water
services are related to their funding history. Around 1970, the Cesbs were created as a
pathway for the first major federal investments in the water and sanitation sector. At that
time, municipalities had no autonomy, especially regarding financing from international
loans. Some municipalities with enough technical and financial support (or potential),
kept the control of their water services. Others (around 70%) handed their water system
to the state administration, they became subject to their investment plan and agenda. The
management, upgrading and maintenance of the city's water system would be the charge
of Cesbs. All the revenues from water services would be responsibility of the state
authority and the tariffs from profitable cities should subsidize small cities' water
systems. Regarding municipal authorities (Saaes), around 30% of the municipalities
presently, the budget of the city and fund from the FNS would pay for the city's water
service.
The agreement between Cesbs and the municipal governments initially involved the
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option of final choice of the head of the Saae. Presently all the staff of the municipal
government water service company's of a municipality can be selected by the city,
however, the sewage collection and treatment is a municipal responsibility. Some cities
had their sewage systems built by the Cesbs, generally simple biological lagoons in
suburban areas. Others are still struggling to finance their wastewater systems, either
from their municipal budget or from possible federal investments.
Present Legislation Concerning Privatization and Concession (Law
8666/93)
It is important to understand the difference between privatization and concessions. In
privatization, a private company buys the stock of a public service and/or utility,
acquiring the "control" of it. In a concession, the respective governmental authority
controls the public service and/or utility, however it is operated and/or maintained by a
private company. Privatization can also be seen as a process, in which case concession is
a step in the privatization process. To ensure the authenticity of a concession, a bid is
required. Bids are a complex governmental procedure especially in bureaucratized
countries such as Brazil. Nevertheless, they are crucial for credibility of the public
contracts and represent the link between the private sector and the public services.
Important sections of Law 8666/93, which regulates the bidding process in Brazil, are
presented in Appendix B. Law 8666/93 provides the latest policy rules on "bidding and
administrative contracts regarding works, services, including publicity, purchases,
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disposals and leasing within the scope of the Powers of the Federation, the States, the
Federal District and the Municipalities." (Sole Paragraph, Appendix B). The President
signed it in June 21, 1993. As established in article 2, bids are mandatory for all
administration entities when hiring outsource works or services, including publicity,
purchases, disposals, concessions, permits and leases. Public agents are forbidden to
restrain or frustrate the competitive character of a concession (Article 3 Appendix B).
Article 5 provides the correction criterions for values or prices, and, therefore, would
regulate also tariff changes for a concession.
Through publications and invitations, a public bid is "placed" in the market as a way to
evaluate the best price and/or efficiency possible for a service and/or work from
companies (public or private) and compare it with the present situation. During this
stage of the bidding process, the scope of the bid is presented (Appendix G, Article 38
and 40) and the requirements for the adequate concessionaire are listed (Appendix G,
Article 27 through 33). During the second stage of a bid process, all the proposals are
analyzed and the "committee" grants the concessionaire according to the decision
criterion proposed (Appendix G, Article 45 shows the criterion alternatives). The results
must be published. Indeed, the public entity conducting the bid must give access to
information regarding the process to anyone who requests it. This procedures, from the
preparation of the bid until its conclusion, is expensive and time consuming. Until five
days before the final contract signature, a bid can be suspended for undetermined period
for many judicial reasons, in which case it is called "contested." These reasons range
from impertinent requirements from the grantor to credibility of the proposals and
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generally they are presented by competitors of the bid. The minimum term up to the
receipt of bids or the occurrence of the event is presented in Article 22 of Law 8666/93
(Appendix B).
There are several types of bid: competitive bidding, price quotes, invitation, contest and
auction (definitions are presented in Appendix G). As shown in Table 3-1 the type of bid
is related to its price.
Table 3-1 Price Categories of bids according to Law 8666/93
Engineering works and Purchases and services
services
Invitation up to R$150.000,00 up to R$ 80.000,00
Price quotes R$1.500.000,00 up to R$ 650.000,00
Competitive bidding higher than R$ 1.500.000,00 higher than R$ 650.000,00
In circumstances when a bid values is much higher (around R$ 5.000.000,00) than those
presented in the Table 3-1, International Invitations are required. They should be
published in the three main languages and any other language pertinent to possible
competitors.
A "Build Operate and Transfer" (BOT) contract would be categorized according to its
present value of the whole project. Since generally it is higher than R$ 1.500.000,00, it
would be a Competitive Bidding for engineering works, services, and purchase.
22
Policy and Regulation Requirements (World Bank)
The World Bank Site, at http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/wstoolkits has a set of
toolkits to guide several aspects of contracts for privatization of public services or
utilities. In this section on the Policy and Regulation Requirements for privatization in
Brazil, I refer mainly to Toolkit 3
(http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/wstoolkits/Kit3/frame.html). However, toolkit 1
presents important steps to take in order to prepare a fair contract among public and
private parties and can be used as a reference for policy planners and contract grantors.
Toolkit 3 poses questions related to legal, financial and regulatory issues for Concession
Arrangements, BOT Arrangements and Management Contracts (Appendix C). It also
organizes a Key Risks Table (Risk Table, Appendix C) showing the expected World
Bank allocation and mitigation of risk.
The three scenarios presented in the Word Bank Toolkit are meant to be general, but in
fact are very similar to the present situation of many municipalities in Brazil (Appendix
C). The questionnaire of Toolkit 3 refers to Concession, BOT, and Management
Arrangements poses the following important questions:
1. Who are the parties to the contracts that constitute the arrangement?
2. What is the object and scope of the contractual arrangement?
3. What is the duration of the arrangement, and what circumstances will give rise to
early termination?
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4. What are the obligations and rights of the concessionaire?
5. What are the obligations of the grantor?
6. What are the key regulatory provisions?
7. How will key risks be managed?
8. How will performance be measured and monitored?
9. How will assets (including land) be transferred?
10. What consents are required?
11. Who will be responsible for past environmental liabilities?
12. How will disputes be resolved?
Law 8666/93 answers almost all this questions, however, the definition of: "Who are the
parties to the contracts that constitute the arrangement?" is not precise, yet. Since there
is not a specific present status for the Cesbs autonomy or responsibility, Question 1 still
has no answer. It remains unknown whether Cesbs will play the rule of the grantor or the
concessionaire, for many municipalities. Actually, the struggle now is to define if Cesbs
will have to participate in municipal bids at all. Table 3-2 shows the issues of this
struggle regarding the participation of Cesbs in municipal bids (i.e. "Bids for all");
whether there will be "No bids for Cesbs" (i.e. special prervileges) or whether Cesbs will
simply be responsible for the contract review or extension of concession.
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Table 3-2 Aspects of Cesbs required participation in bids
No bid for Cesbs
Local Services are a
municipal responsibility
(Article 30, 1988
Constitution)
Cesbs were instituted before
the Law 8666 in 1993
Bid for all
Water and sanitation
improvements are a
obligation of the three
levels of administration
(Federal, State and
Municipal)
(Article 23, part IX)
Cesbs were created for the
development of specific
metropolitan areas and,
therefore, should be obliged
to participate in bids for
other municipal systems.
It is impossible for Cesbs to There should be no
participate in bids due to privileges between
Biding Aspects their non-profitable governmental entities
philosophy
Coordination for the Liaisons between
Political Implications planning of water and governmental agencies and
sanitation improvements is local authorities can create
essential conflicts of interest
Universal access to water No water price control (cost
and sanitation policy (water and service are directly
is free or underpriced) related instead of being
subsidized).
Discussion
Despite the amount of investments required for the sanitary sector and the possible
revenues from concession contracts in Brazil, the risks for private investors is still high.
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Legal Background
In some municipal water systems the improvements in tariff collection and water
metering could already make a concession a profitable investment. However, since
public services in Brazil are nontransferable, tariff control must be a public
responsibility, sometimes of Cesb, sometimes of a municipality. This responsibility
includes collection and pricing.
Another aspect of the present situation of Cesbs is their consolidated relationship with
municipal authorities. This relationship has some positive aspects such as technical
improvements and planning integration, however, it also has also negative points, such
as, corrupt liaisons and stagnation of innovation in sanitary system. Moreover, it has
been proven that state investments can not meet the municipal growth demand (Gazeta
Mercantil, 1998).
In the next hierarchy of water service figures, Figure 3-1 and 3-2, the present situation of
Saaes and Cesbs is shown. Figure1 presents the situation of municipalities with the
Cesbs concession of their water system regarding their hierarchy.
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Public Funds Internationa
Federal Government
I Investments
International Company
Private Company
Figure 3-1: Present situation of water hierarchy, regarding Cesbs
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Figure 3-2 presents the situation of municipalities with the Saaes concession of their
water system regarding water service hierarchy.
Public Funds International Investments
Federal Government
Municipality
Private Company Saaes
International Company
Water Services
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Figure 3-2 Present situation of water hierarchy, regarding Saaes
State
is a possible representation of a successful hierarchy
municipalities with respect to concession of their water or wastewater services.
Public Funds International Investments
Federal Government
International
Company
Private
Company
-* Municipality
V
Cesb ~" Saaes 4-
Water Services
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Private
Company
Figure 3-3: Proposed water hierarchy agreement for municipalities
situation forFigure 3-3
State ~~ -~
The scenario presented in Figure 3-3 would respect the municipal autonomy, and allow
Federal and state investments to be a municipal responsibility. This structure of water
and sanitary administration would require bid for all companies, public or private. The
participation of federal and state governments would ensure the credibility of the biding
process and supply legal background and technical support.
Perhaps, the main point of this hierarchy structure is that the income from the water and
wastewater services would be a municipal responsibility. In the other two existing
structures, the revenues from the consumers tariff is not reinvested in the local system, it
is a Cesb or Saae responsibility and their investment plan sometimes is not the
appropriate for the Municipality.
The administration structure of Figure 3-3 allows the Urban Integrated Approach for all
the sectors of the municipal infrastructure. This way, there would be two levels of
subsidy. A local level of subsidy, where the municipal budget could integrate its
revenues from all tariffs and reinvest in an appropriate manner, and a federal/state level
subsidy, where the federal government could integrate the national and international
investment and focus on a major developing plan, subsidizing low income
municipalities. Applying for a federal or state loan would not mean receiving money for
free. Municipalities where the revenues from their tariffs are not enough to sustain or
develop the city's infrastructure could finance their water or wastewater system through
a lease. This lease would be a financial obligation of the municipality for as long as it
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takes to pay for the federal or state investment, however, the operation and maintenance
of these systems would be local (with state technical support).
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Chapter 4 - Concession of Water and Sewer Services
The Privatization Process
The national security
dictatorship in Brazil,
privatizing sectors in
systems. However the
years. In 1995, sectors
with great success.
and self-sustainability was the legacy from many years of
until 1990 when President Fernando Collor de Mello started
the construction industry, metallurgical industry and power
presidential impeachment in 1992 stopped the process for three
such as telecommunications and highways were being privatized
The financing of the water and sanitation sector in Brazil has developed from federal
subsidy to international loans and private participation. However, by the beginning of
the 2 1St century privatization will be clearly, defined and thus, the future of water and
sanitation sector. Many municipalities will have to choose the best administration
structures, private or public. This will require several improvements in privatization
rules and also economic stability.
In the first section of this Chapter 2, I briefly describe the concession process and
present examples of water and/or sewer privatization in Brazil (Gazeta Mercantil, 1998).
Then, I provide the outline of the present legislation regarding privatization (Law 8666)
In a third section, the basics of policy and regulations requirements for the future of
concession is analyzed.
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Concessions of water services in Brazil
The granting criteria in the bidding process of a concession in Brazil have varied from
case to case over time. The winning proposal of a concession has ranged from the one
with greater welfare benefit (low water prices) to one with best "public" benefit (i.e.
best financial agreement for City Hall).
Since the beginning of the water and sanitation sector privatization process of 1995/96,
the financial sums in the awards of many concessions have been greatly overestimated.
Indeed, it has been found that services rendered by the some private companies to which
the concessions were awarded paled in comparison to the funds granted to them. As a
result, there are many judicial and administrative issues are that currently being debated
in an attempt to resolve the problem.
Table 4-1 shows all the Water and Wastewater Systems Concessions until 1997.
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Table 4-1: Water and Sewage Concession
Municipality State Population Company Granted Type Date Years
Aracatuba* SP 157.467 Amafi Sewage Mai/96 15
Campos dos RJ 35.000 Developer/Quiros Water and Sewage Set/96 30
Gpytacazes* Galvao/Carioca...
Itu SP 112.939 Cavo/Camargo Correa Sewage Mar/96 20
Jau SP 97.354 Amafi/Multiservice Water Nov/95 21
Jundiai SP 288.644 Augusto Veloso/Tejof ran Sewage Jan/96 20
Limeira** SP 217.489 CBPO/Lyonnise des Eaus Water and Sewage Jun/95 20
Mineiros do Tiete SP 9.462 Saneciste Water and Sewage Jul/95 30
Ourinhos SP 79.148 Hidrogesp/Multiservice Water Fev/96 15
Ourinhos* SP 79.148 Telar Sewage Fev/96 20
Pereiras SP 4.850 Novacon Water and Sewage Set/94 20
Riberao Preto SP 450.690 CH2M Hill/REK Sewage Set/95 20
Paranagua PR 110.000 Carioca Water and Sewage Mar/97 28
Cajamar SP 33.707 Multservice/REK/Hidrogesp Water Ago/96 20
Saquarema RJ 110.000 Cowan/Queiroz Galvao/Erco... Water and Sewage Mai/97 25
Mairinque SP 35.000 Vilanova Water and Sewage Fev/97 20
Tuiuti SP 3.000 Novacon Water and Sewage Nov/96 20
Salto SP 100.000 Saneciste Sewage and others Dez/96 20
*Administratively Pending
** Judicially Pending
The usual problems associated with the governmental administration of public services
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include:
* The cost of the product is not related to its market price;
* The State Company can run/produce with a financial deficit;
* It is difficult to control the productivity of the staff and employees;
e Management turnover is not related to performance, but rather to the political
agenda;
* The bureaucracy of public administration.
Following, are the case studies of six cities, Tuitui, Pereiras, Mairinque,
Limeria and Itu, including financial data from the "Associacao,
Concessionarias" (ABCON) Brazilian Association of Concessionaires
Wastewater.
Riberao Preto,
Brasileira de
of Water and
Cities Concession Investment Description
The section does not intend to describe details about these cities financial agreement or
services improvement but, instead points out few important results about their
privatizing contracts (Gazeta Mercantil, 1998). These agreements are examples of
existing concessions and show the importance of a regulatory structure in order to avoid
irregular deals. The example of Limeira shows that the Municipality and the
concessionaire had a financial agreement which suggest corruption and irregular bid. It
was the first concession process in Brazil (1995) and authorities should learn from this
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experience to avoid the same problems in the future.
Limeira
The Limeira municipal district privatized the city water and wastewater concession
systems in 1995. The Municipality has awarded a 20-year concession to the consortium
Aguas de Limeira Partnership.
Limeira Water Partnership is composed by the Brazilian Company of Projects and
Constructions (CBPO, "Construtora Brasileira Projetos Obras", an affiliate of the
Odebrecht Group) and Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux. The responsibilities of both
companies in this project are equal. The contract to do services began in June 1995, and
Limeira Water and Sewage Supply service did the supervision. The law number
8666/93 was used to establish the winner of the bid, one of the criteria was lowest price
bid.
The concession had, and still has, some problems. These problems are related with the
integrity of the concession. Regarding the contract value, interest and water prices,
problems had to be solved by the judicial system. Table 2, Appendix D, contains the
characteristics of the financial agreement of Limeira's concession.
When this program started, approximately 25% of the population had no access to water
treatment services, due to the small reservoir capacity. Only 2-3% of the sewage was
treated There were water losses of the order of 40%, due to the abundance of illegal
connections. Presently, 100% of the population receive treated water and the sewage
collection is approximately 92.5%.The losses were reduced to 27%.
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The monthly income of the partnership is R$1.5 millions. The commitment of
investments is R$100 millions, to be amortized in 10-15 years. During the first eight
years (1995-2002), R$50 million is to be spent by the partnership. From 1995 to 1997
R$ 12.3 millions were invested, and the investment for 1998 were expected to be R$ 7
millions (new data not available).
Table 4-2: Limeira Water and Wastewater Concession
Ribeirao Preto
Ribeirao Preto was one of the first cities to privatize their water treatment services
(1994). The Ambient Concessionaire of Ribeirao Preto was the pioneer in
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Concession General Characteristics
Total Investment: 100 Million
Initial Investment: 6,15 Million
Upgrade Invest. Varies
Max. Concession Period 30 Years
Deferral Period 24 Months
Income
Consumer Growth 1,50%
Payments/month R$1,50 Million
Payments/year R$19,02 Million
Inflation/month 1 %
Insurance
Project fraction 30%
Insurance Tax 6%
Interest/year 1,06 6%
obtaining financial support from The National Bank of Development (BNDES, Banco
Nacional do Desenvolvimento Brasil) to start building systems to treat the water and
sewage. The concession was based on the "Build Operate and Transfer" (BOT) model.
Today, Ribeirao Preto continues to operate its own water supply system.
The partnership is responsible for the construction of two wastewater treatment plants.
The total investments expected are of the order of R$45 million, 70% of which will be
supported by the BNDES. In addition to the plants, 27 Km of interceptors will be built.
The partnership will receive R$0.18 per cubic meter of treated sewage. The 500
thousand inhabitants of Riberao Preto produce an average of 4 thousand cubic meters of
raw wastewater per hour. This amounts to 34.56 million cubic meters per year.
Disregarding the expected population growth of 1.8% per year, the partnership's income
in this period will be R$ 124.2 millions (R$6.21 millions per year). Table 4-3 shows the
main characteristics of the concession contract of Ribeirao Preto.
Table 4-3: Ribeira Preto Sewage Concession
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Concession General Characteristics
Total Investment: R$ 45,00 Million
Concession Period 20 Years
BNDES Financing
Amortization Life 10 Years
Initial Value R$ 30,00 M
Internal Return Rate 18,4%
Payments 10 Years
Itu
Cavo Itu won the bid in March 1996 for the water and sewage treatment concession in
Itu. The concession period is 20 year and the new treatment station is already operating.
The total amount invested is R$ 25.9 millions and from this money R$ 23.8 millions
(90%) was invested in the pre-operational portion of the project. In 1996, R$ 2.38
million were invested (10%) and in 1997 R$ 16.66 million (70%) were invested. The
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Payment / year (R$6,77) M
Number of Payments 10
Privet Banks
Amortization Life 20 Years
Bank interest 6% Years
Value R$ 15,00 M
Payments (R$1,31)
Income
Number of Costumers ( base unit.) 450600
Consumer Tax- Sewage 0,18 R$/ m3
Pop. Wastewater Production 34,56 Mm3/year
Consumer Growth 1,80%
Water + Sewage Value 0,405 R$/ m3
Insurance
Project fraction 30%
Insurance Tax 6%
Interest/year 1,08 8%
remaining 20% was invested in 1998. About R$ 2.2 million are programmed to be
invested during the period of the concession, for the construction of additional sewage
treatment stations.
The concession in Itu is based in the construction of three sewage treatment stations
(Canjica, Pirajibu, Sdo Miguel), pumping stations, conduits and iron pipe systems.
Mairinque
The concession for water and sewage treatment in Mairinque city belongs to Ciagua (a
company specializing in these services). The contract was signed in February, 1997, but
the system did not begin operation until May, 1997.
The company is committed to spend R $30 million during the concession period of 30
years. During the first two years, the investment is expected to be around R$ 8.6
million. 35% of this will be contributed by the city, the remaining will come from
companies that are financing the project. Through January, 1998, the money spent in
this project was around R$1.5 million.
Before the concession, the city had no sewage treatment. The number of water
connections increased about 10% from May 1997 to January 1998 and the sewage
collection increased 3% in the same period. Water losses dropped from 72% to 55%,
while water metering increased 28%.
The BNDES bank financed R$ 5.37 million. Ciagua is to begin paying off its debt over
a period of ten years, beginning two years after receiving the loan. The total investments
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in water supply systems will be broken down into the following scheme: R$4.37 million
will be spent on the water system, R$2.17 million will be spent on the sewage system
and R$1.73 million will be spent on operation and management of the water and
wastewater service. This totals R$ 8.27 million, of which 35% is to be contributed by
Ciagua. The average monthly income in 1997 was R$120 thousand and the expected
income for December 1998 is R$ 220 thousand.
Pereiras
The Pereira City concession contract was signed in 1994 with Novacon, date before
which the town hall had the responsibility of water and wastewater treatment.
Up to 1996, the total amount of the investments was R$604 thousand. During the year of
1997, the investment was R$600 thousand, and in the future Novacon has the intention
of investing around R$1.5 million to improve the water and waste water treatment.
In 1997, losses accounted for 30% of the total flow. The company is currently working
on the possibility of a reduction to 15% of water loss. Also by 1997, all water
consumption was already metered, and the next intended step of the company is now to
replace all of the hydrometers to give the consumer and the service provider greater
accuracy. With all of these improvements, the income of Novacon in Pereiras is R$25
thousand per month.
Tuiuti
Novacon is the company that operates the water and wastewater system in the city of
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Tuiuti. The concession was signed in November of 1996. The municipal district has 800
water connections and two employees working on the system. The investments made
since December, 1997 are between R$70 and R$80 thousand. The collection of taxes is
done by "mediadores" (middlemen). The water intake is done through deep wells. The
income is R$11 thousand a month. Sewage treatment has to be operated by the
municipal district, while Novacon has the responsibility for the design of the sewage
treatment plant.
Dicussion
The ownership of all the water/wastewater systems in Brazil will return to city hall in
the next few years. At this junction, each city will decide what to do with its own water
system. It is feasible to think of all the emerging Brazilian cities having their water
systems privatized; but what about small non-profitable cities?
Maybe the answer for this question is federal management with local operation and/or
subsides depending on the situation.
It is important to evaluate what level of investment is really required to the existing
system. In order to improve the water system as a whole, it is necessary to implement
the following actions: management improvements, control of illegal connections,
reduction operational costs, installation of new connections, pipe system maintenance,
pipe system installation, improvement of existing water treatment facilities, and
construction of new water treatment facility. It should be mandatory for each city to
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assess the operation thoroughly in order to evaluate what level of improvement will be
necessary in each case.
Regarding the city's concession analysis, The City of Limeira is an inappropriate
example of private participation in a concession. The NPV shows that after the second
year the new administration is already receiving profits from the investment this is
contrary to all other concessions in which a profit is not realized until the tenth year.
See Appendix D for a different privatization agreement (for Limeira) with a much higher
capital investment or tariff reduction. In alternative 1 the city hall could charge the
concessionaire almost R$80 Million and the IRR would still be considered profitable
(i.e., greater than 17%). In alternative 2 the wastewater tariff was reduced 70% and the
investment is still payable in 12 years (considered a acceptable payback period). Riberao
Preto financial spreadsheet is also presented in Appendix A as an example of expected
investment characteristic from a concession. Table 4-4 shows the results from the
financial spreadsheets presented in Appendix D.
Table 4-4: Result of Concession Agreement Analizys
Financial Limeira Limeira Limeira Riberao Preto
Index Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Payback 2 years 9 years 12 years 10 years
Period
Internal Rate 169 % 21 % 20 % 23 %
of Return
Benefit Cost 3.5 2.1 1.4 1.4
Ratio _ _ _1_1
There is still much to learn about privatization, meanwhile public concession contracts
are expiring. The question is not about the initial situation (a water system as
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governmental property) or the final one (all public systems privatized). The main
question is the transition.
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Chapter 5 - Financial Analysis of CEPT in Tatui
Introduction
The purpose -of this chapter is to evaluate the financial costs of the MIT-CEPT designs
(Alternatives A2 and A3), and to compare them to the costs of the SABESP-Aerated
lagoon design (Alternative Al). To accomplish a fair comparison, costs will be tallied
using the same assumptions that the SABESP design does.
In Brazil, the design consultant firm is responsible for quantifying the design in terms of
specific tasks (i.e. units of labor, equipment and material usage). Each of the tasks is
included in a database managed by SABESP. This database provides cost per unit of
these services.
Methods for Cost Comparisons
The SABESP cost database presents the aggregated cost to accomplish a specific task.
For example, the cost of moving one cubic meter of soil includes the cost of labor and
transportation of the soil, and its unit is currency per cubic meter of soil, per kilometer of
distance to transport.
The method to compare the costs between the 2 MIT-CEPT designs and the SABESP
design therefore relies on a comparison between the various SABESP units.
Consequently, the MIT-CEPT design costs will be estimated using the SABESP
standard, in order to provide an accurate cost comparison.
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The cost comparison will rely on a quantitative comparison using the various SABESP
task units (i.e. volume of earth moved, foundation reinforcements, etc.). The CEPT
budget will neglect the differences in the predicted pipe installation as well as all items
related to the power station construction since it would not be representative.
SABESP's quantifying system assumes that there are no unknown variables for the
construction. This means, for instance, that all the information regarding quantities of
rock demolition, although estimated, will represent the actual amount of worker and
machinery rent hours, as well as the volume of rock demolished and transported.
Regarding special units for these quantities, global items (represented as GB, which is
the Sabesp' unit for "global") include all services and/or amount of supplies necessary to
accomplish the entire specified task. The lists presented in the page ahead use the same
nomenclature as Sabesp's lists.
SABESP Pricing Structure
The SABESP pricing system represents the estimated price to accomplish a unit service
including all the necessary related items. For example, the price of soil removal deeper
that 4 meters includes: worker's hours, machinery rent hours, and material used.
However, the unit is m3 and the price corresponds to soil digging beneath four meters.
With this pricing structure, it is difficult to estimate price reduction factors, such as
economies of scale, or the construction company profit. The service taxes also vary
geographically, but the SABESP prices remain the same.
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In this study two out of four SABESP's lists of services and equipment are important:
list-3 , hydraulic equipment, and list-4, electric equipment. The price unit for these lists
is GB (global). The services that are related to the installation of all the equipment
included in those lists are evaluated in two different SABESP budget items. These items
bear titles such as "installation of hydraulic equipment of list-3" or "installation of
electrical equipment of list-4".
List-3 includes several items. Among them, there are three specifications related to
aerator items: floating aerators (15hp), iron cables (diameter 3116"), and aerator fixing
structures. These items will be excluded from the Alternative A2 and A3 CEPT design
budget, and the installation price will be reduced accordingly.
List-4, with all electrical equipment necessary for the whole wastewater treatment plant,
will remain the same. However, it is important to notice that since no aerators will be
used in the CEPT treatment system alternatives, there would be a slight decrease in this
price. By using the same price, the MIT-CEPT budget will therefore be conservative.
This can be seen as a buffer for any unexpected costs.
Moreover a fifth price list will be included for the MIT-CEPT design alternatives. This
list will consist of all the equipment required for the coagulant addition: pumps, flow
meter and storage tanks.
The Design Alternatives for Upgrading Tatui's WWTP
Tatui is a small city 120 km from Sio Paulo, with a population of 120,000 inhabitants
and a overloaded wastewater treatment facility. The treatment system presently is
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composed by two lagoons, one anaerobic and the other facultative, in a 5 ha area in the
suburbs of the city. The efficiency and the condition of the WWTP CEAGESP was
evaluated by Milton Tomoyuki Tsutiya and Orlando Zuliani Cassettari in 1992
(Appendix E presents the translation of their work). In 1998, a bid was placed in order to
upgrade one of the City's WWTP (called CEAGESP).
The MIT CEPT Project consists of the study of the present design of the WWTP in Tatui
and three alternatives for upgrading the system. The design alternative number 1 (Al)
has been presented by Sabesp in the bid for the system's upgrading. It was designed by
Ampi and approved by Eduardo Pericle Colzi in 1996. It consists of four tracks of two
lagoons, one mechanically aerated followed by a settling tank. The sludge of Al is
pumped from the settling lagoons and dewatered in sludge drying beds (SDB). The two
other alternatives, numbers 2 (A2) and 3 (A3) rely on Chemically Enhanced Primary
Treatment (CEPT) for the removal of total suspended solids (TSS) and its related
biological oxygen demand (BOD).
The alternatives A2 and A3 were designed by three MIT graduate students (Christian
Cabral, Frederic Chagnon and Domagoj Gotovac) as the final project for the Master's of
Engineering Program at MIT in 1999. Professor D. Harleman and research engineer
Susan Murcott supervised the design. The details of the assessment conducted by the
MIT group in Tatui and the design are presented in the MIT CEPT Project 1999. The
project also gives the background of this treatment technology, which consists of the
addition of chemicals to increase the efficiency of the settling tank or lagoon.
Alternative A2, adds chemicals in the conventional way, that is, in primary
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settling tanks before the lagoon treatment. Alternative A2 is composed of a CEPT tank
followed by an anaerobic lagoon of 1 ha and 3.3 ha of facultative lagoons, 3 ponds of
1.1 each. The sludge from the CEPT tank is dewatered in a filter press and then
composted through windrows in a 0.6 ha area.
Alternative A3 consists of an anaerobic settling lagoon, where the CEPT chemicals
would be added, followed by another anaerobic lagoon (1 ha) and finally three
facultative lagoons (3.3 ha of total area, 1.1 each). In alternative A3, the chemicals are
added in the first anaerobic lagoon's inlet, in-pond settling occurs, and the settled matter
is biologically stabilized during a one-year period at the bottom of the lagoon. The
sludge produced in the first lagoon, after anaerobic biodegradation during one year,
would then be pumped to the sludge drying beds (SDBs). For the schematic of the three
alternatives of treatment and the area distribution see Appendix F, Figures 1, 2 and 3.
Table 5-1 presents the areas and depths required for each treatment for the three
alternatives.
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Table 5-1: Design areas and depths of Al, A2 and A3
In the next section I estimate the capital cost (CC) and the operation and maintenance
costs per month (O&M) for Al, A2 and A3. The first section presents the final table of
total CC of the three alternatives. The services and supplies are grouped in 15 group
items. In terms of CC, the differences in quantities between the three alternatives are
seen in 5 items: Soil Movement, Foundations and Structures, Supplies, Sludge
Treatment, and Other (installation of hydraulic and electric equipment).
Total Capital Cost for Alternatives Al, A2 and A3
The budget for the construction of lagoons treatment systems, neglecting the land price,
consists essentially of land movement, foundations and structures, and wastewater
treatment. The following sections divide the construction budget of three WWTP in 15
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Treatment Al Al A2 A2 A3 A2
Area (he) Depth(m) Area (he) Depth(m) Area (he) Depth(m)
Aerated 0.8 3.5 X X X X
Settling 1.3 4.0 X X 1.0 3.5
Anaerobic X X 0.6 3.5 0.6 3.5
Facultative X X 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.0
main items. Chart 5-1 shows the general distribution of costs for Al, A2 and A3.
R$3,000,000.00
R$2,500,000.00
R$2,000,000.00
R$1,500,000.00
R$1,000,000.00-
R$500,000.00
R$--
Al A2 A3
M SOIL MOVEMENT M FUNDATIO NS &STRUCTURES 0 SUPPLIES 0 SLUDGE TREAMENT 0 EXTRA SERVJICES
Chart 5-1 Capital Costs of Alternatives Al, A2 and A3
As mentioned in previous sections of this CC analysis, the cost of these WWTP options
are ultimately a comparison between Sabesp's required services and materials, including
equipment, and those of the CEPT designs. The Table 5-2 presents the construction
budget for the three alternatives. All prices are given in Brazilian Reais. The exchange
rate used is R$1.20 per US$ 1.00 referring to the year 1998.
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Table 5-2 Construction Costs for Al, A2 and A3
Al A2 A3
ITEM ESPECIFICATION TOTAL PRICE TOTAL PRICE TOTAL PRICE
1 Total ADM/GENERAL FACILITIES R$16.926,22 R$ 16.926,22 R$ 16.926,22
2 Total TECHNICAL SERVICES R$ 8.045,70 R$ 8.045,70 R$ 8.045,70
3 Total PRELIMINARY SERVICES R$ 74.520,00 R$ 74.520,00 R$ 74.520,00
4 Total SOIL MOVEMENT R$ 473.825,53 R$ 583.002,82 R$ 670.761,97
5 Total DRAINGE & PUMPING R$ 3.581,50 R$ 3.581,50 R$ 3.581,50
6 Total FUNDATIONS & STRUCTURES R$ 287.347,45 R$ 340.901,15 R$ 283.415,55
7 Total PIPE INSTALATION R$ 14.059,23 R$ 14.059,23 R$ 14.059,23
8 Total PAVEMENT R$ 37.995,00 R$ 37.995,00 R$ 37.995,00
9 Total ALVENARIA R$ 35.458,81 R$ 35.458,81 R$ 35.458,81
10 Total PAINTING R$ 85.715,79 R$ 85.715,79 R$ 85.715,79
11 Total URBANIZATON R$ 27.422,46 R$ 27.422,46 R$ 27.422,46
12 Total GENERAL SERVICES R$ 1.500,00 R$1.500,00 R$ 1.500,00
13 Total SUPPLIES R$1.342.490,61 R$ 823.349,26 R$ 823.349,26
14 Total SPECIAL SERVICES R$ 1.270,00 R$ 1.270,00 R$ 1.270,00
15 Total SLUDGE TREAMENT R$ 347.103,93 R$ 320.000,00 R$ 360.765,97
16 Total OTHER R$ 98.620,17 R$ 31.526,40 R$ 31.526,40
Final Total ETE - CEAGESP (1st STAGE) R$ 2.855.882,39 R$ 2.405.274,34 R$2.476.313,86
Although the CC of alternatives A2 and A3 of CEPT WWTP upgrading are only about
10% cheaper than the SABESP design, the operational cost of A2 and A3 is much lower
than SABESP's (as will be shown in the section "Operation and Maintenance" ahead).
For the detailed costs for these alternatives, refer to Appendix G . Below I describe the
items where CETP technology represented a capital cost change. For detailed budget for
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each item of all three alternatives, refer to Appendix G.
Construction Budget
This section describes the 3 budgets. Most of the item's prices were based on using
Brazilian suppliers. All the prices refer to 1998, when Sabesp evaluated the Al budget.
All the pipe installations for the filter press, CEPT tank and CEPT storage facility are
included.
Soil Movement
Generally, the most expensive part of a lagoon system WWTP construction budget, 30%
to 35%, is the soil movement. Since, lagoons are essentially topographic arrangements,
its price is related to the volume of soil displaced (excavated, borrowed and filled), the
amount of sludge dredged (and disposed), trench excavation (for the pipe system), and
dikes (compacted and protected with pre-cast concrete slabs). Since lagoon treatment
relies on natural stabilization, it requires more area than alternative Al treatment.
Indeed, the design criteria for facultative and anaerobic lagoons are area load and
volumetric load, respectively. Aerated lagoons, on the other hand, base their design
criterion on power for the mechanical aeration to stabilize (oxidize) the organic matter in
the wastewater. The settling lagoons only have to maintain a minimum hydraulic
detention time for the maximum flow. The result is that alternatives A2 and A3 requires
2 and 2.3 times, respectively, the area of alternative Al. Refer to MIT CEPT Project for
the specifications and details of the design of the three alternatives. Appendix G presents
the required areas, depths as well as an estimate of the amount of required services and
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required services and supplies, such as, excavation and dredging volumes, concrete slab
areas, dike lengths, etc.
Foundations and Structures
Foundations and structures represent 20% to 30% of a WWTP budget. This item
contains the concrete related sub-items including services and materials for the
construction of the facility's devices and sub-items related to foundations. There are
only two differences between the alternatives in respect to structures and foundations. In
alternative A2, a R$ 80,000.00 CEPT tank is included and the length (and total price) of
dikes is about 30% less than alternative Al. Since the chemical addition for A3 will
occur in the inlet of the anaerobic lagoon, no CEPT tank is necessary.
Supplies
In the item called Supplies, all the piping system is included. I estimate the same budget
for the pipe network for the three alternatives, however the lists of hydraulic equipment
change (List 3, Appendix G). In alternative Al, List 3 includes general hydraulic parts
and all the aerators related equipment, for alternatives A2 and A3 the price of this
equipment is deducted from the final price of the list (List 3 without aerators, Appendix
G). List 4, with the electrical equipment, assumes the same price for the three
alternatives. List 5 consists of the pumps, chemical tanks and other equipment related to
the CEPT technology so these costs are included in alternatives A2 and A3. The overall
cost of supplies is approximately the same for alternatives Al and A2. However, the cost
of supplies for alternative A3 is 40% less than Al. Appendix G shows the description
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and price of all the lists of prices (Lists 3, 5 and 6, Appendix G).
Sludge Treatment
The item called Sludge Treatment includes all the structure, foundations and equipment
for the sludge handling. The sludge treatment system used for Al is the same as the one
used for A3, i.e. a pump boat to pump the sludge from the bottom of the lagoon and
SDBs to dewater the sludge. Alternative A2, however, uses composting instead of pump
boat. For A3 the sludge is pumped from the CEPT tank to the filter press. After
dewatering it is mixed with wood chips or ashes and set on windrows for the final
stabilization. The price of composting, is a rough estimate since there is no previous
Brazilian experience using it in municipal wastewater treatment.
Installation of Hydraulic and Electric Equipment
The installation of hydraulic and electric equipment item is considered as 10% and 20%,
respectively, of the price of the equipment.
Operational and Maintenance Costs
This section will price the monthly operation and maintenance expenditures of operation
of the three alternatives. Sabesp's design requires a complex operation because of the
aeration system. The calibration of aerators requires a permanent efficiency control
executed by the WWTP staff. The calibration of this equipment is based on the
efficiency of the volume of air mixed, however, their efficiency changes during their
lifetime use. Generally, the lifetime of an aerator ranges from 6 to 10 years, for the
O&M evaluation of the alternative Al it will be considered as 10 years. In alternative
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Al the aerators energy consumption and maintenance are estimated to be around
R$25,000.00. On the other hand, operation of a lagoon wastewater treatment system is
simple. In Brazil, it generally requires one operation assistant to control the vegetation
growth at the borders of the lagoons and the alga growth in the lagoons and to maintain
the site (fences, cleaning of facilities, etc.). The operation of a CEPT tank was designed
to require one sludge removal per day. The experience of the operation staff also could
reduce the chemical consumption by learning about low loading hours. For A2 and A3,
the chemical concentration would initially be 50 ml/L and 25 ml/L, respectively, 12
hours per day. The pump boat used in alternatives A1 and A3 to remove the sludge from
the settling lagoons and its O&M would cost R$ 3.000,00/month.
The total O&M cost varies among the three alternatives. The price of the CEPT's O&M
alternatives is lower because is consists mainly of labor, which in Brazil is low.
However, for alternative A2 the price of O&M is 2.3 times the O&M cost for A3 due to
the inclusion of composting which is estimated as the salary of two extra assistants, the
maintenance of the filter press and the biosolids handling (tractor and conductor).
Nevertheless, both final CEPTs alternatives' O&M costs are lower than Sabesp's. A2 is
28% lower and A3 is 69% lower.
Alternative #1
In the Sabesp design the considerations for the monthly cost of the O&M of the facility
essentially include staff salary, aerators energy consumption and maintenance. Table 5-3
shows the O&M for alternative Al
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Table 5-3: O&M for Al
Unit Quantity Price/unit Total price/month
Pump Boat consumption & maitenance R$/month 1 R$3.000,00 R$ 3.000,00
Energy consumption of aerators hp 300 R$ 76,67 R$ 23.000,00
Assistants R$/month 2 R$1.200,00 R$ 2.400,00
Engineer R$/month 1 R$3.000,00 R$ 3.000,00
TOTAL R$ 31.400,00
Alternative #2
The operation of a CEPT facility is simple and relatively cheap. The typical CEPT plant
would have a monthly cost as a function of the price and quantity of chemicals used as
well as the operational staff salary. The pumps used to ensure the proper chemical
dosage and mixing require very low energy consumption and the price of chemicals
represent around 10% of the final cost of O&M.
Table 5-4 has the cost of the optimum dosage of iron-salts chosen for the treatment. It
was determined through jar tests (MIT CEPT Project, 1999). The price of the ferric
chloride was considered US$ 180/ton.
Table 5-4: Optimum dosage of iron-salts chosen for the A2 treatment
Cost assuming 50 mg/L (FeC3)
Mass of chemical Volume of chemical Price
Kg/day (dry) Kg/month (dry) I/day I/month R$ / month
348 10,433 248 7452 1,565
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The price of composting was estimated based in two main aspects: the resulting
biosolids have no market and the composting process is basically hand labor. Sludge
from WWTP in Brazil is not commonly commercialized for agriculture and, in this
budget analysis, it is not considered. The composting requires two assistants for the filter
press and a tractor with operator. The time constrains for the preparation of this theses
and the MIT CEPT Project resulted in a rough estimation of composting price in Brazil.
Table 5-5 presents a estimation of monthly cost of A2.
Table 5-5: O&M for A2
Unit Quantity Price/unit Total price/month
Energy consumption of pumps R$/month 1 R$ 500,00 R$ 500,00
Chemical consumption kg 10,433 R$ 0,15 R$ 1.564,92
Energy consumptio of dewatering system R$/month 1 R$ 2.000,00 R$ 2.000,00
Composting (tractor maintenance& fuel, R$/month 1 R$1 0.000,00 R$ 10.000,00
operator,and related items)
Pump Boat energy&maitenance R$/month 1 R$ 3.000,00 R$ 3.000,00
Assistants R$/month 2 R$ 1.200,00 R$ 2.400,00
Engineer R$/month 1 R$ 3.000,00 R$ 3.000,00
TOTAL R$ 22.464,92
Alternative #3
For Alternative A3 the optimal chemical concentration required for the settling of the
58
particles in the lagoon is much lower than in A2 since the detention time is much higher
than in the settling tank. The detention time in the Alternative A2 is around one hour
while in the Alternative A3 it is around 1,5 days. Refer to the MIT CEPT Project for
details about optimum chemical dosage. Table 5-6 is the cost of the optimum dosage of
iron-salts and polymer chosen for the treatment.
Table 5-6: Optimum dosage of iron-salts chosen for the A3 treatment
Cost assuming 25 mg/L (FeCl3)
Mass of chemical Volume of chemica Price
Kg/day (dry) Kg/month (dry) L/day L/month R$ / month
174 5216 124 3726 938,952
Alternative A3 requires mainly an assistant to maintain the facility, the chemicals, and
an engineer to supervise. Table 5-7 shows the monthly expenditure f A3.
Table 5-7: O&M for A3
Unit Quantity Price/unit Total price/month
Energy consumption of pumps hp 1 R$ 500,00 R$ 500,00
Pump Boat (depretiation, consumption and R$/month 1 R$3.000,00 R$ 3.000,00
maitenance)
Chemical consumption kg 5216,4 R$ 0,18 R$ 938,95
Assistants R$/month 2 R$1.200,00 R$ 2.400,00
Engineer R$/month 1 R$3.000,00 R$ 3.000,00
TOTAL R$ 9.838,95
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Concession Analysis for Tatui
There are several possible criteria for the choice of the best alternative, the one with the
best overall efficiency, the one with the minimal environmental impact, the one with the
minimal required area, etc. Since the overall efficiencies of the three alternatives are
similar (Gotovac, 1999), and they occupy the same area, the goal in this thesis is to
select the best alternative using cost as the screening mechanism. To accomplish it,
investments parameters such as capital cost, operation and maintenance cost, present
value, payback period, internal rate of return and benefit cost ratio are compared in a 10-
year concession scenario
A concession is a effective way to analyze the investment for the construction and
operation of a WWTP in Brazil. In this section, I present a comparison of the three
hypothetical concession alternatives as a means to evaluate the CEPT designs. To
accomplish this financial comparison, I chose three investment parameters: present
value (PV), internal rate of return (IRR) and payback period (PP). The revenues of these
hypothetical concessions would come from 50% of a wastewater treatment tariff of R$
0,50, i.e. R$ 0,25/m3 of wastewater treated. I am assuming an average population
growth for the concession period of 1,5% per year. The PV of a project is the most
important parameter for an investment analysis, it considers the CC plus all the O&M
annual costs. Both CEPT designs, A2 and A3, have significant reduction in PV ( 21%
and 37%, respectively), relative to Al largely because of the difference in the O&M
costs. The IRR is the standard comparison index for long term projects. In general, a
concession IRR has to be greater than 15% to be considered profitable. The PP is the
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number of years required for a investment to be "bankable." This means the number of
years to pay the initial investment and return some profit to the investor after the
concession is over. In alternative Al, the revenues will never pay the initial investment.
The Table X presents the PV, IRR and PP for Al, A2 and A3 considering a 10-year
project life and a financing of 12% percent per year. This relatively short project design
period of 10 years was selected at the recommendation of the Sabesp staff from Tatui.
There is no insurance or inflation considered, since both these items can vary
considerably.
Table 20 presents the PV, IRR and PP for Al, A2 and A3
Table 5-8: PV, IRR and PP for Al, A2 and A3
Al A2 A3
O&M (/year) R$ 376.800,00 R$ R$
269.579,04 118.067,42
Capital Cost (CC) R$ 2.855.882,39 R$ R$
2.405.274,34 2.476.313,86
Present Value R$4.984.886,43 R$3.928.456,04 R$3.143.421,13
CC amortization R$505.445,96 R$425.695,47 R$438.268,34
Payback Period non payable 12 5
Internal Rate of Return 3% 13% 20%
(I RR)__ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _
Present Value of Revenues R$6.180.154,76 R$6.180.154,76 R$6.180.154,76
Benefit Cost Ratio 1,2 1,6 2,0
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Chapter 6 - Summary and Conclusion
Summary
In this theses, the water and sanitation sector in Brazil is described in order to evaluate
the present situation of legal structure of the sector and the policy requirements for a
successful concession in the case study of the upgrade of Tatui WWTP upgrading.
Chapter 2 - Brazilian Background presents the relation between health and water and
sanitation development, using child mortality statistics. It also briefly explores the
history of the water and sanitation sector.
In Chapter 3, I analyze the present models of public administration and introduce
Brazilian water services authorities, such as, Cesbs and Saaes. I also show their
differences regarding their financing. Chapter 3, points out important sections of Law
8666/93, which regulates the legislation concerning privatization and concession.
Finally, the World Bank privatization policy is shown and compared with the present
situation of the privatization process in Brazil.
In Chapter 4, several examples of concessions in the water and/or sewer sector are listed.
Some of these concessions have been highly successful and one, Limeira's, suggests
possible contract problems between the Municipality and the concessionaire.
Chapter 5 provides an overview of a possible technology (CEPT) as an upgrading
alternative for overloaded wastewater lagoons. The chapter describes the budget
comparison of two CEPT designs and the proposed SABESP design. The most
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important expenditures of a concession are the O&M costs, which, as estimated in this
chapter, are much lower for the CEPT alternatives. O&M is an important parameter
because when calculating the present value of a project, which is composed of capital
cost and the O&M expenditures during the life of the project, it can represent from 43%
(for Al) to 21% (for A3) of the present value of the investment. Chapter 5 shows the
possible savings using CEPT in lagoon treatment systems when compared to aerated
lagoons followed by sedimentation basins. Finally the chapter describes a hypothetical
concession of Tatui WWTP as a means to compare the three alternative investments.
Conclusion
I have used cost (PV, IRR, PP and BC) as the most important criterion to screen
treatment alternatives. Applying this criterion leads us to the conclusion that alternative
A3 is the most suitable one, since the O&M cost for alternative is around 1/3 of
Sabesp's expected monthly expenditure. However, to be able to introduce this
technology in a concession in Brazil, several regulatory improvements would have to be
achieved. Policy changes required for improvement in the concession process are related
to the definition of the Federal-State-Municipal-Concessionaire responsibility.
The federal government will play the most important role in order to achieve the
required decentralization degree of water and wastewater services. Municipalities must
be aware of their water and wastewater service responsibility and the federal
government must give them the tools to do so.
In order to prepare municipalities for their water and wastewater service privatization,
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the Federal government is obliged to provide:
* Definition of environmental standards;
* Responsibility over interstates water bodies;
e Cross subsidies in the national economy level;
e Bids credibility;
e Technical guidance;
* Regulatory support;
e Funds provision (national/international) for non-profitable water systems;
* General planning of the sector development;
State participation during the privatization process of municipalities will be mainly
related to monitoring of:
" Water and wastewater system performance;
e National environmental standards enforcement;
e Investments planning;
Municipalities will have to learn about their role and responsibilities, since their efforts
must be towards the determining the best concession agreement for their water system,
and the local supervision of the service.
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Once decentralization measurements are taken, it will be up to the intended
concessionaires to present the suitable financial agreement and/or technical alternative to
the municipality.
Only then will appropriate technologies, such as CEPT, be applied successfully!
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Appendix A
Table 1: Price of base consumption (R$/10m3) for all Cesbs
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Appendix B
PRINCIPLES
Article 1 - This Law establishes general rules on bidding and administrative contracts
regarding works, services, including publicity, purchases, disposals and leasing within
the scope of the Powers of the Federation, the States, the Federal District and the
Municipalities.
Sole Paragraph - Besides direct Administration entities, special funds, government
agencies, public foundations, state-owned companies, private and public joint stock
companies and other entities directly or indirectly controlled by the Federation, the
States, the Federal District and the Municipalities shall also comply with this Law.
Article 2 - Public Administration's works, services, including publicity, purchases,
disposals, concessions, permits and leases, where outsourced, shall be mandatorily
preceded by bidding, with due regard to the exceptions herein provided for.
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Sole Paragraph - For the purposes of this Law, contract means every and all agreement
between agencies or entities of the Public Administration and private entities, to
establish a relationship and reciprocal obligations, regardless of the denomination used
for such purpose.
Article 3 - The bidding aims at guaranteeing compliance with the constitutional isonomy
principle and at selecting the most advantageous offer for the Administration, and shall
be considered and decided on pursuant to the strict principles of legality, impersonality,
morality, impartiality, publicity, administrative probity, binding to the invitation to bid,
objective judgment and related principles.
§ 1 Public agents are forbidden to:
I - admit, plan, include or tolerate, in the bidding notice acts, clauses or conditions that
impair, restrain or frustrate the competitive character thereof or that establish priorities
or privileges as regards the nationality, head office or domicile of the bidders or as
regards any other inappropriate or irrelevant condition for the specific object of the
contract;
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II - establish a discriminatory treatment of commercial, legal or labor nature, or to give
priority to Brazilian or foreign companies as regards currency, modality and local for
payment, even when financing from intemational agencies are involved, except for the
provisions set forth in the next paragraph and in article 3 of Law No 8.248 of October
23,1991.
Article 4 - All of the participants to the bidding sponsored by the agencies or entities
referred to in Article 1 have the public right, subject to due compliance with the
pertinent procedures set forth herein, and any citizen may follow the progress of such
procedures, provided that he/she does not cause any disturbances nor prevents the
development of the works.
Sole Paragraph - Bidding procedures provided for by this Law characterize formal
administrative acts, irrespective of the level of the Public Administration in which it
takes place.
Article 5 - Any and all values, prices and costs used in the bidding shall be expressed in
domestic currency, except for the provisions of article 42 of this Law, and each unit of
the Administration shall, upon payment of the obligations related to the supply of
goods, leasing, completion of works and service rendering, comply with, depending on
each different source of resources, the strict chronological order of the date of its
obligations, except when material reasons of public interest are present and upon prior
justification by the pertinent authority, duly published.
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§ 1 - The credits referred to in this article shall be corrected by criteria provided for in
the invitation to bid and such criteria shall preserve their values.
§ 2 - The correction mentioned in the above paragraph, whose payment shall be made
together with the principal, shall comply with the same budget appropriation related to
the credits to which it refers.
DEFINITIONS
Article 6 - For purposes of this Law, the following terms shall mean:
I - Work - any construction, refurbishment, manufacture, recovery or enlargement,
directly or indirectly carried out;
II - Service - every activity aimed at obtaining a specific benefit of the interest of the
Administration such as: demolition, repair, installation, assemblage operation,
conservation, repair, adaptation, maintenance, transportation, lease of assets, publicity,
insurance or technical-professional works;
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III - Purchase - every remunerated acquisition for the supply of goods, to take place just
once or in as many times as necessary;
IV - Disposal - every transfer of the ownership of assets to their parties;
V - Large scale works, services and purchases - those whose estimated value is higher
than twenty five times (25) the limit established in sub-item "c" of paragraph 23 of this
Law;
VI - Performance Bond - the bond that guarantees due compliance with the obligations
assumed by companies in the bid and contracts;
VII - Direct Execution - the one carried out by the Administration's agencies and
entities, with their own resources;
VIII - Indirect Execution - the agency or entity that contract third party's services, under
any of the following systems:
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a) contract work for a global price - work or service contracted for a fixed and global
pnce;
b) contract work for a unit price - work or service contracted for a fixed price regarding
specific units;
c) (vetoed)
d) task contract - labor contracted for small services, for a fixed price, whether including
or not the supply of materials;
e) total contract work - work contracted in its entirety, including all of its stages, the
necessary services and installations, under the total responsibility of the contractor until
delivery of the work to the client, and in conditions to start operation pursuant to
technical and legal requirements for its use under structural and operational safety
conditions and having the characteristics adequate to the purposes to which it was
contracted.
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IX - Final Design - a set of essential and sufficient elements with the adequate level of
precision to characterize the work or service, or the group of works or services object of
the bidding, prepared according to the preliminary technical studies that guarantee the
technical feasibility and the adequate treatment of the work's environmental impact and
which allows for an assessment of the work cost and the definition of the methods and
term for the execution. The Final Design shall include the following items:
a) development of the selected solution so as to provide for a global overview of the
works and clear identification of all its components;
b) global and focused technical solutions, described in sufficient details so as to
minimize the need of reformulating or adopting alternatives during the various stages of
the detailed design and performance of works and assemblage;
c) identification of the types of services to be executed and the material and equipment
to be incorporated to the works, as well as their respective specifications, in order to
ensure the best results for the enterprise, without impairing the competitive character of
its execution;
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d) information that allow for the study and assumption of constructive methods,
temporary facilities and organizational conditions for the work, without impairing the
competitive character of its execution;
e) subsidies for the preparation of the bid's plan and management of works, including its
time schedule, supply strategy, rules for inspection and other essential data for each
case;
f) detailed budget of the works' global cost, based on duly appraised quantity of
services and supplies;
X - Detailed Design - the set of essential and sufficient elements for the complete
execution of the work, according to applicable rules set forth by the Associagdo
Brasileira de Normas T&nicas - ABNT (The Brazilian Association of Technical
Standards);
XI - Public Administration - the Federation, States, Federal District and Municipalities'
direct or indirect Administration, including public legal entities under the control of the
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public power or of the foundations created or maintained by it;
XII - Administration - agency, entity or administrative unit through which the Public
Administration effectively operates and acts;
XIII - Official Press - official press used to publicize acts of the Public Administration,
where the "Federal Official Gazette" is the one used by the Federation; and the ones
determined in the respective laws are used by the States, the Federal District and the
Municipalities;
XIV - Client - entity or agency undersigning the contractual instrument;
XV - Contractor - individual or legal entity undersigning the contract entered into with
the Public Administration;
XVI - Committee - permanent or special committee, established by the Administration
with the purpose of receiving, examining and judging all of the documents and
procedures related to bidding and the registration of bidders.
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QUALIFICATION
Article 27 - In order to qualify for the bidding the interested parties shall only be
required to submit the following documents:
I - legal capacity;
II - technical ability;
III- economic and financial ability;
IV - regular tax status.
Article 28 - Documents related to legal capacity, as the case may be, shall include:
I - Identity card;
II - trade registration, in the case of individual company;
III - duly registered articles of incorporation, bylaws or articles of association in force, in
the case of business companies and documents evidencing the election of directors, in
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the case of joint stock companies;
IV- registration of the articles of incorporation, in the case of civil associations, together
with evidence of election of the board of officers presently in office;
V - authorization decree, in the case of a foreign company operating in the country and
the registration or authorization issued by the proper agency, where the activity so
requires.
Article 29 - Documents related to regular tax status, as the case may be, shall include:
I - evidence of enrollment in the taxpayers' list (Cadastro de Pessoas Ffsicas - CPF -
Cadastro Geral de Contribuintes - CGC);
II - evidence of regular status as regards payment of federal, state or municipal taxes in
the place in which the bidder is domiciled or headquartered, or equivalent, pursuant to
the law;
IV - evidence of regular status as regards payment of the Employee's Dismissal Fund
(Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Servigo- FGTS), showing the regular payment of
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social charges determined by law;
BIDDING PROCEDURES AND DECISION
Article 38 - Bidding procedures shall start with the opening of a duly announced,
officially recorded and numbered administrative proceeding containing the respective
authorization, a concise indication of its object and of own provisions for expenses and
the following documents shall be attached to it:
I - invitation to bid or invitation and respective attachments, as the case may be;
II - evidence of the publications of the abridged invitation to bid, pursuant to article 21
of this Law or evidence of the delivery of the invitation;
III - act for the appointment of a bidding committee, of the administrative or official
auctioneer or persons responsible for the invitation;
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IV - original copy of the proposals and the documents attached thereto;
V - minutes, reports and resolutions by the Judging Committee;
VI - expert or legal opinions issued on the bidding, bidding exemption or non-
requirement;
VII - awarding acts regarding the object of bidding and respective homologation;
VIII - appeals eventually submitted by bidders and their respective opinions and
decisions;
IX - order for bidding cancellation or revocation, as the case may be, well-founded on
detailed conditions;
X - contract or equivalent instrument, as the case may be;
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XI - other evidence of publications;
XII - other documents regarding the bidding.
Sole paragraph - The drafts of the invitations to bid, as well as the drafts of contracts,
agreements, covenants or arrangements shall be previously examined and approved by
the Administration's legal staff.
Article 40 - The preamble to the invitation to bid shall contain the number of the order,
in annual series, the name of the interested division and its sector, the modality, the
system of execution and the type of bidding, the indication that the bidding shall be
governed by this Law, the local, date and time for receiving the documentation and the
proposal as well as for the opening of the envelopes and shall, mandatorily, include the
following:
I - a concise and clear description of the object of the bidding;
II - the term and conditions for the performance of the contract, or withdrawal of the
documents, as provided for in article 64 hereof, for the performance of the contract and
for the delivery of the object of the bidding;
III - penalties for events of default;
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IV - place at which the Final Design may be examined and acquired;
V - if a Detailed Design is available on the date of the publication of the invitation to bid
and the place where it may be examined and acquired;
VI - conditions for participation in the bidding, according to articles 27 to 31 of this law
and form to submit the proposals;
VII - criterion for decision, including clear provisions and objective parameters;
VIII - place, time and access codes of the remote media which shall supply the elements,
information and clarification regarding the bidding and the conditions to meet the
obligations necessary for the performance of the object of the bidding;
IX - equivalent payment conditions for Brazilian and foreign companies, in the case of
international bidding;
** XI - adjustment criterion that shall reflect the effective production cost variation. The
adoption of specific or sectoral indexes from the date scheduled for submitting the
proposal or the budget to which this proposal refers to until the date of the performance
of each installment shall be allowed;
§ 1 - The original copy of the invitation to bid shall be dated, and all of its pages shall be
initialed by the authority that issued it and shall be kept attached to the bidding
proceedings. Integral or concise copies of the invitation to bid may be taken for its
publicity and supply to the interested parties.
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§ 2 - The following are attachments to the invitation to bid and shall be an integral part
thereof:
I - the basic and/or detailed Design, including all of its parts, drawings, specifications
and other complements;
II - estimated budget, in spreadsheets, containing the quantities and unit prices;
III - a draft of the contract to be entered into by and between the Administration and the
bid winner;
IV - complementary specifications and performance rules relevant to the bidding;
Article 45 - Judgment of the proposals shall be objective and the Bidding Committee or
entity responsible for the invitation shall render such decision in compliance with the
type of concession and criteria previously established during the summoning act and
pursuant to the factors exclusively referred to in such act, in order to ensure bidders and
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controlling entities the means to verify the decision.
§ 1 - For purposes of this article, the following are types of bidding, except in the
case of a contest:
I - lowest price bidding - whenever the selection criteria for choosing the most
advantageous proposal for the Administration determines that the winner shall be the
one who submits a proposal according to specifications set forth in the invitation to bid
and offers the lowest price;
II - the best technique bidding;
III - price and technique bidding;
IV - highest bidding or offer - in the case of disposal of assets or concession of
real right to use (direito real de uso).
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Appendix C
Table 1: World Bank web page :Toolkit 3
(http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/wstoolkits/Kit3/frame.html)
Concession Arrangements: Legal, Financial, and
Regulatory Issues
Who are the parties to the arrangement?
What are the object and scope of the agreement?
What is the duration of the concession. and what might lead to
early termination?
What are the obligations of the concessionaire?
What are the obligations of the grantor?
What are the key regulatory provisions?
How will key risks be managed?
How will performance be measured and monitored?
How will assets be transferred to the concessionaire?
What consents are required?
Who will be responsible for environmental liabilities?
How will disputes be resolved?
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Build-Operate-Transfer Arrangements: Legal,
Financial, and Regulatory Issues
Who are the parties to the contract?
What are the object and scope of the BOT arrangement?
What is the duration of the BOT arrangement, and what might
lead to early termination?
What are the obligations of the BOT operator?
What are the obligations of the grantor?
What are the key regulatory provisions?
How will key risks be managed?
How will performance be measured and monitored?
How will assets be transferred to the BOT operator?
What consents are required?
Who will be responsible for environmental liabilities?
How will disputes be resolved?
Management Contracts: Legal, Financial, and
Regulatory Issues
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Who are the parties to the contract?
What are the object and scope of the management contract?
What is the duration of the contract?
What are the rights and obligations of the operator?
What are the obligations of the grantor?
How will performance be measured and monitored?
What consents are required to operate the facility?
Who will be responsible for environmental liabilities?
How will disputes be resolved?
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Table 2: Risk Allocation on Privatization Processes according to the World Bank
Key risks
What steps can Who typically In what types of
What is the How does it mitigate the bears the contract does What steps can
risk? arise? risk? remaining risk? the risk arise? minimize risks?
Design and development risk
Design defects in Design fault in Require the The public BOT, concession Check tender
water or tender public sector to sector. (especially with specifications.
sewerage plant. specifications. provide a remedy new
or compensate infrastructure).
the project
company.
Design Include The design BOT, concession Monitor design
contractor fault. provisions in the contractor. Once (especially with work; replace
design contract liquidated new contractors
requiring the damages are infrastructure). insurance.
contractor to exhausted,
provide a remedy finance from
or pay damages project lenders is
(insurance drawn down.*
cover).
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Construction risk
Cost overrun. Within the Provide for cost The construction Concession, Monitor and
construction overrun in fixed contractor. Once BOT. inspect
consortium's lump sum price liquidated construction
control- in the damages are work; provide for
inefficient construction exhausted, early warning
working contract. standby finance mechanisms in
practices, waste is drawn down. the contract.
of materials.
Beyond the Allocate cost The insurer. Concession, Obtain approvals
construction overruns in the Once insurance BOT. in advance;
consortium's concession proceeds are anticipate
control-changes contract; exhausted, the problems and
in a law, delays purchase investor's return allocate risk in
in obtaining business might be eroded contract; use
approvals or interruption because of insurance.
permits, insurance. timing effects.
increased taxes.
Within the
construction
consortium's
control-lack of
coordination of
subcontractors.
Beyond the
construction
consortium's
control-insured
force majeure
event.
Delay in
completion.
Draw on
proceeds from
business
interruption
insurance policy.
The constructor.
Once liquidated
damages are
exhausted,
standby finance
is drawn down.
The insurer.
Once insurance
proceeds are
exhausted,
standby finance
is drawn down,
debt service
coverage ratios
will be reduced,
and investor's
return might be
eroded.
Concession,
BOT.
Concession,
BOT.
Monitor and
inspect
construction
work; provide for
early warning
mechanisms in
the contract.
Rely on
insurance.
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Require
liquidated
damages from
the turnkey
contractor under
the construction
contract
(sufficient to
cover interest
due to lenders
and fixed
operating costs).
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Failure of plant to
meet
performance
criteria at
completion tests.
Within the
construction
consortium's
control-quality
shortfall, defects
in construction.
Require
liquidated
damages
payable by the
construction
consortium,
supplemented by
insurance.
The construction
consortium and,
once liquidated
damages are
exhausted, the
insurer. Once
insurance
proceeds are
exhausted,
investor return is
eroded.
Concession,
BOT.
Monitor and
inspect
construction
work; provide for
early warning
mechanisms; use
insurance.
Operating cost
overrun.
Change in
operator's
practices at
project
company's
request.
Require project
company to
provide a remedy
or compensation
under the
operating
contract.
The project
company bears
the risk under the
operating
contract; debt
service coverage
ratios are
reduced;
sponsor's return
is eroded.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Build flexibility
into contract;
cost changes in
practices in
advance; define
acceptable
reasons for
changes; provide
for changes in
remuneration
after initial
period.
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Failure or delay
in obtaining
permissions,
consents,
approvals.
Operator failure.
Public sector
discretion.
Require
liquidated
damages
payable by the
operator under
the operating
contract.
Allocate risk in
the operating
contract.
The operator.
Once liquidated
damages are
exhausted, debt
service coverage
ratios and return
are reduced.
The public
sector. Where
there is no public
sector discretion,
licenses are
processed
quicker by the
project company,
so the project
company bears
the risk.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Monitor and
inspect operating
practices;
provide for early
warning
mechanisms.
Obtain approvals
in advance
where possible;
ensure clear
division of
responsibilities in
the contract.
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1 ~ 1
Shortfall in water
quality or
quantity.
Operator's fault
(malpractice).
Project
company's fault.
Require
liquidated
damages
payable by the
operator.
Require
liquidated
damages
payable by
project company
to the public
authority.
The operator.
There is no effect
on other parties
until liquidated
damages are
exhausted, when
debt service
coverage ratios
are reduced and
the owner's
return is eroded.
The project
company. There
is no effect on
other parties until
payment of
Iliquidated
damages
completely
erodes
shareholder
returns, when
cash flow may
become
insufficient and
the project
company's return
is eroded.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Monitor and
sample water
quality and
quantity; provide
for early warning
mechanisms.
Quantity: ensure
security of
supply; enter into
bulk water supply
contract.
Quality: monitor
and sample
water quantity;
provide for early
warning
mechanism.
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Revenue risk
Increase in bulk Service Allocate risk by As allocated by Lease, Fix price by
water supply difficulties; no contract; adjust contract; bulk concession, contract and
price. security of tariffs; if there are water supplier. BOT. pass through
supply. off-take and bulk price increase.
water supply
agreements, both
guaranteed by
the government,
pass through the
price increase.
Change in tariff Fall in revenue. Risk depends on The project Lease, Ensure a clear
rates. extent of company. There concession, regulatory
government is no effect BOT. regime.
support. There is unless there is
usually no no common off-
market risk in take agreement
water prices if an and unless
off-take hedging facilities
agreement is in are not in place
place. If not, or do not
owners may use compensate for
hedging facilities losses, in which
such as forward case the return
sales, futures, can be severely
and options. reduced.
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Water demand. Decreased
demand.
Risk depends on
extent of
government
support. Use
shadow tolls; use
long-term take-
or-pay off-take
agreement that
leaves the
demand risk with
the public utility
(guaranteed by
the government).
Risk depends on
extent of
government
support. If there
is no support and
no off-take
agreement, the
risk is borne by
the project
company.
Exchange rate. Devaluation of
local currency,
fluctuations in
foreign
currencies.
Include in
security package
hedging facilities
against
exchange rate
risks such as
currency rate
swaps, caps, and
floors.
There is no effect
unless hedging
facilities are not
in place or do not
compensate for
losses, in which
case the return
can be severely
reduced.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Require loans in
local currency
and same
currency as
revenue.
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Lease,
concession,
BOT.
Ensure
exclusivity of
supply,
Nonconvertibility
or
nontransferability
Foreign
exchange.
Have the
government
guarantee
availability,
convertibility, and
transferability
(with the ministry
of finance a party
to the contract); if
the government
defaults, the
project company
can terminate.
Have the central
bank ensure the
continuing
availability of
foreign
exchange.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Transfer funds
offshore as much
as possible.
Interest rate. Fluctuations in Same as above See above Operation and Negotiate fixed
interest rates. (for hedging (exchange rates). maintenance, rate loans.
facilities against concession,
exchange rate BOT.
risks).
Force majeure risk
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The government.
If the government
defaults on its
guarantee and
the project
company
terminates, the
government pays
compensation for
termination.
Force majeure.
Legal and
regulatory.
Flood,
earthquake, riot,
strike.
Changes in tax
law, customs
practices,
environmental
standards.
If risk relates to
an insured event
(such as
earthquakes in
certain regions),
the policy is
called; if not,
standby finance
is drawn down.
If during the
operating period,
adjustment is
possible (see
provisions in
contract on
compensation).
If during the
construction
period, draw
down standby
finance.
The insurer.
There is no effect
unless the event
is not insured or
is uninsurable. If
the insurance
policy is
exhausted, there
might be a
severe impact on
project returns.
The project
company or
operator.
The contractor.
Standby finance
could be
required.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Use insurance
and government
guarantees;
clearly define
force majeure in
contract; include
provision in
contract that if
the changes are
specific to the
project (rather
than general),
the government
bears the risk.
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Breach or
cancellation of
the concession.
Expropriation.
The project
company is
entitled to
terminate if the
government
defaults.
Take out political
risk insurance
with official
bodies, such as
export credit
agencies, with
private
companies,
orinvolve
multilateral
agencies (IBRD,
IFC) in the
financial
package.
The government
pays
compensation to
the project
company if the
company
terminates.
Once the
insurance policy
is exhausted, the
project company
bears the risk.
See clause in
contract on
expropriation.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Use insurance.
Use insurance.
Failure to obtain See contract. The government. Operation and Obtain approvals
or renew maintenance, in advance
approvals. concession, where possible.
BOT.
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Political.
Creeping
expropriation
(discriminatory)
taxes, revocation
of work visas,
import
restrictions.
See contract. See contract. If
the government
has discretion, it
should bear the
risk.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Interference See contract. The government. Operation and
causing severe maintenance,
prejudice concession,
(sometimes BOT.
referred to as
force majeure).
Insurance risk
Uninsured loss or Accidental Insure against all Once standby Operation and Quantify and
damage to damage. the main risks. debt finance is maintenance, allocate risk in
project facilities, drawn down, the concession, advance in the
project BOT. contract.
company's return
is reduced.
Environmental risk
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Environmental
incidents.
Operator's fault. Require
indemnity from
the operator.
The operator.
There is no effect
unless the
operator's
payments are
exhausted and
standby finance
is drawn down, in
which case the
project
company's return
is reduced.
Operation and
maintenance,
concession,
BOT.
Use insurance. 1
Preexisting Provide for public The public Operation and Carry out
environmental sector cleanup or sector. maintenance, detailed
liability. compensation. concession, environmental
BOT. survey; use
insurance.
Liquidated damages are payments that the contractor or operator is required to make to the sponsor of
the project if specified performance targets or milestones are not reached. They are capped at a
percentage of the contract's value. The amount of the liquidated damages is agreed at the contract's
signing.
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Concession Arrangements: Legal, Financial, and Regulatory Issues
Scenario
A public utility provides water and sanitation services to customers through an
inadequate and outdated distribution network. Substantial capital investment is needed
to make up for years of underinvestment: only a small number of people in the service
area have sewerage connections, and the water supply cannot meet rapidly increasing
demand. The distribution reservoirs, pumping stations, water treatment plants, and
distribution network all need upgrading. The government has determined that it can gain
stakeholder and political support for involving the private sector in the provision of
water and sanitation services. It has also found that the country's broad regulatory
framework is consistent with private sector involvement and that private investment in
water and sanitation will not involve undue risks to consumers or to private investors,
and it has established that the tariffs necessary to cover the required investments are
politically and economically feasible. So it has decided to seek a concession for
operation and expansion of water and sanitation services.
Build-Operate-Transfer Arrangements: Legal, Financial, and Regulatory Issues
Scenario
The systems for supplying bulk water and treating wastewater cannot keep pace with
demand-new capacity is needed. The water distribution and sewage collection systems
are functioning well, however, with low physical and commercial losses. And tariffs
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allow full cost recovery-or could readily be raised to a level at which they would.
These are conditions conducive to private sector involvement, a possibility for which
there is reasonable political support. So the public authority turns to the private sector to
provide the new capacity needed by constructing and operating a new plant for bulk
water supply and sewage treatment on a greenfield site-under a build-operate-transfer
(BOT) arrangement.
Management Contracts: Legal, Financial, and Regulatory Issues
Scenario
A management contract might be chosen as a means of improving operational
efficiency in a mature water and sanitation utility, where there is no need for substantial
new investment, or where there is insufficient political support for moving to a lease
arrangement (in which the private sector would take on commercial risk). More often,
however, management contracts are seen as an initial step toward more substantial
private sector involvement in countries or cities where initial conditions are not
conducive to private sector investment and risk-taking because, for example:
"The information available about the state of the system is poor. Tariffs are below
cost recovery levels and can be raised only slowly, and there are no government
budgetary resources for substantial subsidies. The government lacks the capacity to
administer a complex arrangement for private sector participation over the long term.
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The government has no track record as a regulator, or a poor one, and there is no
credible regulatory framework."
In such cases a management contract can allow gains in the efficiency of service
delivery and in the quality of services, and provide a "window" during which
deficiencies in the regulatory framework can be remedied and information about the
system improved.
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Appendix D
Table 1: Limeira concession of water and wastewater system
Concession General Characteristics
Total Investment: 100 Million
Initial Investment: 6,15 Million
Upgrade Invest. Varies
Max. Concession Period 30 Years
Deferral Period 24 Months
Income
Consumer Growth 1,50% /year
Payments/month R$1,50 Million
Payments/year R$19,02 Million
Inflation/month 1 %
Insurance
Project fraction 30%
Insurance Tax 6%
Interest/year 6%
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Table 2: Present agreement of Limeira's concession
Date Year Income Invest Insuran Operation Total Cost Net NPV Cost/
ments ce Costs Benefit Benefit
1995 1 -4.10 -1.80 -1.90 -7.80 -7.80 -7.80 3.5
1996 2 19.02 -4.10 -2.05 -6.15 12.88 4.61 -
1997 3 20.47 -4.10 -2.20 -6.30 14.17 19.05
1998 4 22.02 -7.54 -2.37 -9.91 12.11 32.30
1999 5 23.69 -7.54 -2.55 -10.09 13.60 47.84
2000 6 25.49 -7.54 -2.74 -10.28 15.21 65.92
2001 7 27.43 -7.54 -2.95 -10.49 16.93 86.81
2002 8 29.51 -7.54 -3.17 -10.71 18.79 110.82
2003 9 31.75 -7.14 -3.42 -10.56 21.19 138.65
2004 10 34.16 -7.14 -3.67 -10.82 23.34 170.31
2005 11 36.75 -7.14 -3.95 -11.10 25.65 206.18
2006 12 39.54 -7.14 -4.25 -11.40 28.14 246.69
2007 13 42.54 -7.14 -4.58 -11.72 30.82 292.31
2008 14 45.77 -7.14 -4.92 -12.07 33.70 343.55
2009 15 49.24 -7.14 -5.30 -12.44 36.80 400.97
2010 16 52.98 -5.70 -5.70 47.28 472.30
2011 17 57.00 -6.13 -6.13 50.87 551.51
2012 18 61.33 -6.60 -6.60 54.73 639.33
2013 19 65.98 -7.10 -7.10 58.88 736.57 IRR
2014 20 70.99 -7.64 -7.64 63.35 844.12 169%
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Table 3: Concession alternative number 2 for Limeira's agreement, with an initial
investment of R$80 million.
Date Year Income Invest CC Operation Total Cost Net NPV Cost/
ments Costs Benefit Benefit
1995 1 0.00 -4.10 -80.00 -1.90 -86.00 -86.00 -86.00 2.1
1996 2 19.02 -4.10 -2.05 -6.15 12.88 -78.29
1997 3 20.47 -4.10 -2.20 -6.30 14.17 -68.82
1998 4 22.02 -7.54 -2.37 -9.91 12.11 -60.83
1999 5 23.69 -7.54 -2.55 -10.09 13.60 -50.88
2000 6 25.49 -7.54 -2.74 -10.28 15.21 -38.73
2001 7 27.43 -7.54 -2.95 -10.49 16.93 -24.11
2002 8 29.51 -7.54 -3.17 -10.71 18.79 -6.77
2003 9 31.75 -7.14 -3.42 -10.56 21.19 14.01
2004 10 34.16 -7.14 -3.67 -10.82 23.34 38.19
2005 11 36.75 -7.14 -3.95 -11.10 25.65 66.14
2006 12 39.54 -7.14 -4.25 -11.40 28.14 98.25
2007 13 42.54 -7.14 -4.58 -11.72 30.82 134.96
2008 14 45.77 -7.14 -4.92 -12.07 33.70 176.76
2009 15 49.24 -7.14 -5.30 -12.44 36.80 224.17
2010 16 52.98 -5.70 -5.70 47.28 284.89
2011 17 57.00 -6.13 -6.13 50.87 352.86
2012 18 61.33 -6.60 -6.60 54.73 428.75
2013 19 65.98 -7.10 -7.10 58.88 513.36 IRR
2014 20 70.99 -7.64 -7.64 63.35 607.51 21%
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Table 4: Concession Alternative 2 for Limeira agreement with wastewater tariff
reduced 70%
Date Year Income Invest Insuran Operation Total Cost Net NPV Cost/
ments ce Costs Benefit Benefit
1995 1 -4.10 -1.80 -0.57 -6.47 -6.47 -6.47 1.4
1996 2 5.71 -4.10 -0.61 -4.71 0.99 -5.87
1997 3 6.14 -4.10 -0.66 -4.76 1.38 -4.84
1998 4 6.61 -7.54 -0.71 -8.25 -1.64 -6.77
1999 5 7.11 -7.54 -0.76 -8.30 -1.20 -8.38
2000 6 7.65 -7.54 -0.82 -8.36 -0.72 -9.59
2001 7 8.23 -7.54 -0.89 -8.43 -0.20 -10.37
2002 8 8.85 -7.54 -0.95 -8.49 0.36 -10.63
2003 9 9.52 -7.14 -1.02 -8.17 1.36 -9.91
2004 10 10.25 -7.14 -1.10 -8.25 2.00 -8.50
2005 11 11.02 -7.14 -1.19 -8.33 2.70 -6.32
2006 12 11.86 -7.14 -1.28 -8.42 3.44 -3.26
2007 13 12.76 -7.14 -1.37 -8.52 4.25 0.79
2008 14 13.73 -7.14 -1.48 -8.62 5.11 5.95
2009 15 14.77 -7.14 -1.59 -8.73 6.04 12.35
2010 16 15.89 -1.71 -1.71 14.18 27.27
2011 17 17.10 -1.84 -1.84 15.26 44.17
2012 18 18.40 -1.98 -1.98 16.42 63.24
2013 19 19.79 -2.13 -2.13 17.66 84.70 IRR
2014 20 21.30 -2.29 -2.29 19.01 108.79 20%
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Riberao Preto privatization is an example of a regular concession agreement.
Table 5: Ribeira Preto Sewage Concession
Concession General Characteristics
Total Investment: R$ 45,00 Million
Concession Period 20 Years
BNDES Financing
Amortization Life 10 Years
Initial Value R$ 30,00 Million
Internal Return Rate 18,4%
Payments 10 Years
Payment / year (R$6,77) Million
Number of Payments 10
Privet Banks
Amortization Life 20 Years
Bank interest 6% Years
Value R$ 15,00 Million
Payments (R$1,31)
Income
Number of Costumers ( base unit.) 450600
Consumer Tax- Sewage 0,18 R$/ m3
Pop. Wastewater Production 34,56 Mm3/year
Consumer Growth 1,80% /year
Water + Sewage Value 0,405 R$/ m3
Insurance
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Project fraction 30%
Insurance Tax 6%
Interest/year 8%
Table 6: Riberao Preto concession analizes
Date Income Insura Privet BNDES Operation Total Cost Net NPV Cost/
nce Banks Benefit Benefit
1996 0 -0.81 -1.31 -3.89 -6.00 -6.00 -6.00 1.4
1997 6.22 -1.31 -3.89 -0.62 -5.81 0.41 -5.96
1998 6.33 -1.31 -3.89 -0.63 -5.83 0.51 -5.81
1999 6.45 -1.31 -3.89 -0.64 -5.84 0.61 -5.55
2000 6.56 -1.31 -3.89 -0.66 -5.85 0.71 -5.17
2001 6.68 -1.31 -3.89 -0.67 -5.86 0.82 -4.66
2002 6.80 -1.31 -3.89 -0.68 -5.87 0.93 -4.01
2003 6.92 -1.31 -3.89 -0.69 -5.89 1.04 -3.21
2004 7.05 -1.31 -3.89 -0.70 -5.90 1.15 -2.25
2005 7.18 -1.31 -3.89 -0.72 -5.91 1.26 -1.12
2006 7.30 -1.31 -0.73 -2.04 5.27 4.08
2007 7.44 -1.31 -0.74 -2.05 5.38 9.71
2008 7.57 -1.31 -0.76 -2.06 5.50 15.79
2009 7.71 -1.31 -0.77 -2.08 5.63 22.37
2010 7.84 -1.31 -0.78 -2.09 5.75 29.46
2011 7.99 -1.31 -0.80 -2.11 5.88 37.11
2012 8.13 -1.31 -0.81 -2.12 6.01 45.34
2013 8.28 -1.31 -0.83 -2.14 6.14 54.21
2014 8.42 -1.31 -0.84 -2.15 6.27 63.73 IRR
2015 8.58 -1.31 -0.86 -2.17 6.41 73.97 23%0
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Appendix E
The Tatui Wastewater Treatment System 1992 Report
This appendix summarizes the Tatui Report from 1992, which contains the most recent
information, found in the literature, regarding Tatui main wastewater treatment lagoon,
ETE CEAGESP. It was prepared by Milton Tomoyuki Tsutiya and Orlando Zuliani
Cassettari as a response to an assessment required by Sabesp in 1992 (the report was
translated by Christian Cabral).
The CEAGESP wastewater treatment plant began operating in 1978. At that time the
service population was approximately 20,000 inhabitants and the anaerobic and the
facultative lagoon were approximately 2.5 meters deep.
Since the treatment plant has no provision for sludge removal, the sludge accumulation
in these lagoons has decreased the detention time of the system and, therefore, its
efficiency.
The population by the year of 1992 using this facility was around 49,000 and the overall
BOD removal efficiency only 60%. At that time, depth of the anaerobic pond was 1.5m
and the facultative, only 1.3m.
The major problems related to the maintenance of the lagoons are: short circuiting, due
to the irregular sludge settling and overflow rates, and short detention time, related to the
sludge accumulation in the bottom of these lagoons.
The collection system
The Tatui Report also evaluated the city's wastewater collection system and its
performance. The flow ranged from 88.06 to 176.18 IJsec/inhab in 1992. The sewage
return coefficient (the volume of sewage produced divided by amount of water
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consumed) varied from 0.52% to 0.84%, which is considered normal. The averages of
maximum flow coefficient and the minimum flow coefficient per hour was 2.69 and
0.37. Regarding the condition of the collection system, the infiltration rate was 0.33
1/sec/km of pipe. Compared to Brazilian standards these results are considered as
normal, except for the infiltration rates, which is considered high.
The Lagoons
The report also shows the characteristics of the wastewater and sludge based on this
analyzes pH and temperature measurements made every 30 minutes during one week
(09/14/92 until 09/21/92):
Minimum Maximum Unit.
Values of pH 4 7 [pH]
Air temperature 12 30 Celsius
Water temperature 17 30 Celsius
Although the variation of pH is unusual (too acid for tropical ponds) 90% of the
measurements were around pH 7.
Wastewater Measurements
To represent the influent wastewater conditions several parameters were chosen and the
average is shown in the following tables.
Suspended Solids, BOD and COD averages:
Averages Unit
BOD 73.5 Grams/inhabitant/day
BOD filtered 37.5 Grams/inhabitant/day
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TSS 35.8 Grams/inhabitant/day
VSS 44.0 Grams/inhabitant/day
The average BOD in Brazil is 54 grams/inhabitant/day; therefore these results indicate
that these lagoons were already working over their capacity in 1992.
Sludge Analyses
The following data about the anaerobic and facultative lagoons gives the average depth
of the sludge accumulated through 14 years:
Anaerobic Lagoon Sludge Accumulation:
Initial Lagoon Volume (1978) 35,326 m3 Final Lagoon Volume (1992) 23,786 m3
Area 23,551 m2 Final Sludge Volume 11,540 m3
Average Sludge Depth 49 cm Sludge Percentage 31.2 %
Average Sludge Accumulation Per year 3.9 Cm/year
Facultative Lagoon Sludge Accumulation:
Initial Lagoon Volume (1978) 32,765 m3 Final Lagoon Volume (1992) 26,060 m3
Area 25,204 m2 Final Sludge Volume 67,10 m3
Average Sludge Depth 26.6 cm Sludge Percentage 17.7 %
Average Sludge Accumulation per year 2.2 Cm/year
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The solids composition of the sludge is shown in the next table:
The Biological Analyses of the Sludge:
The report from 1992 also analyses the pathogenic microorganism concentration of the
sludge as follows:
Salmonellas
Total Coliforms
Fecal Coliforms
Ascaris Lumbricoides
Enterobius Vermiclaris
'Tridhuris Trichiura
Hymendepis Nana
<2 To 9 MPN/100ml
8 To 24 MPN/100ml
2.2 To 17 MPN/100ml
70 To 110 /100mg of sludge
0 To 90 /100mg of sludge
0 To 10 /100mg of sludge
0 To 40 /100mg of sludge
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Total Solids 9.26 %
Fixed Solids 5.28 %
Volatile Solids 3.98 %
Total Suspended Solids 8.54 %
Fixed Suspended Solids 5.53 %
Volatile Suspended Solids 3.01 %
1 0A5
1 0A5
Although the Salmonellas count represents a normal concentration, the concentration of
the rest of the pathogenic organisms is considered too high for agricultural application
on vegetable crop according to Sabesp's standards.
Present Situation
Nowadays, these lagoons are less efficient than in 1992. From our visual observation we
noticed some extra factors that appear to interfere in the wastewater treatment efficiency.
First, the condition of the algae growth on the surface of the lagoons and vegetation all
over the margins suggests that there is a lack of proper maintenance (cleaning).
Second, the access to this facility is in bad conditions making it more difficult to
maintain the area.
Third, some of the inlets to the anaerobic and facultative lagoons are blocked and the
effect of hydraulic short circuiting is aggravated on account of this.
Fourth, the permanent usage of the discharge of river from the first lagoon is damaging
the condition of the receiving body (River Manduca) suggesting necessary corrections to
clean up the pollution to the river.
Despite these negative aspects of the present situation of the lagoon, there is almost no
odor problem even when there is no wind.
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Clonorchis Simensis 10 To 20 /100mg of sludge
Anacilostomideos 0 To 10 /100mg of sludge
Balantiduim Coli 0 To 10 /100mg of sludge
Appendix F
Schematic of the three alternatives treatment and the area distribution
Anaerobic Lagoon (2.5ha) Facultative Lagoon (2.5ha)
Figure 1: Schematic of the existing treatment and the area distribution of WWTP
CEAGESP
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Aerated Tanks (1.2ha)
Sludge Drying Beds (0.3ha)
I. :~
Settling Tanks (1.3ha)
ggg Second Stage Upgrading (1.h
Figure 2: Schematic of the alternative Al treatment and the area distribution
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M CEPT acilityFacultative Lagoon (3.3ha) Dewatering Facility '
Anaerobic Lagoon (0.7ha) Composting Area (0.5ha)
Figure 3: Schematic of the alternative A2 treatment and the area distribution
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CEPT Settling Lagoon (1.0ha)
Sludge Drying Beds
Facultative Lagoon (3.3ha)
Anaerobic Lagoon (0.7ha)(0.6ha)
Figure 4: Schematic of the alternative A3 treatment and the area distribution
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...... ......
2 years
Al, Quantity
ETE CEAGESP
AppM&P!Gesign Characteristics
Sludge hight 0.4
Water hight 2
Border 0.6
Lagoons
Aerated Number Area total area depth Volume
of lagoons hec hec m m3
4 0.19 0.76 4.1 31160
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area depth volume depth volume
7600 2.7 20520 0.4 3040
Concrete pile area
Perimeter Width Area
768 2 1536
Settling Number Area total area depth Volume
of lagoons hec hec m m3
4 0.315 1.26 4.6 57960
Soil Managing
IlEscavation Dredging
area depth volume depth volume
12600 3.2 40320 0.4 5040
Concrete pile area
Perimeter Width Area
1040 2 2080
Total Volume
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area ave. depth volume depth volume
20200 3.01 60840 0.4 8080
Total concrete pile area 3616
Filling Material
Diques
Section length volume
37.5 590 22125
Regularization 8375
Total volume required 30500
Sludge Drying Beds Number Area total area depth Volume
SDB m2 m2 m m3
24 125 3000 4.1 12300
Materials
Sand 0.12 360
gravell&2 0.12 360
grave3&4 0.24 720
grave<4 0.25 750
Bricks area 3090
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A2, Quantity
ETE CEAGESP
CEPT Tank Design Characteristics
Present condition
Lagoons meters
Sludge hight 0.4
Water hight 2
Border 0.6
CEPT Tank
meters
Sludge hight 1
Water hight 3.5
Border 0.5
Length 20
Width 4
CEPT Tank Numbe r Area total area depth Volume
of Tanks m2 m2 m m3
3 70 210 4.5 945
Soil Managing
Escavation
area depth volume
210 4.8 1008
Structure Concrete
Perimeter total h Area thickness volume
104 5 520 0.3 156
Lagoons
Anaerobic Number Area total area depth Volume
of lagoons hec hec m m3
1 0.64 0.64 4 25600
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area depth volume depth volume
6400 2.6 16640 0.4 2560
Concrete pile area
Perimeter Width Area
443 2 886
Facultative Number Area total area depth Volume
of lagoons hec hec m m3
1 3.31 3.31 3 99300
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area depth volume depth volume
33100 1.6 52960 0.4 13240
Concrete pile area
Perimeter Width Area
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A2, Quantity
818 2 1636 1
Total Volume
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area ave. depth volume depth volume
39,710 1.8 70,608 0.4 15,884
Total concrete pile area
Filling Material
2522
area depth volume
17000 0.5 8500
Diques
Section length volume
37.5 510 19125
Regularization 8,500
Total volume required 27625
Transportation of fill/borrow material 90% of soil movement 110,203 M3XKM
Windraw length total length ave width total area
lines m m m/line m2
3 150 450 10 4500
Filterpress
Tractor full eq.
1
1
150000
80000
Coagulant Tank Facility
Filter press Facility
Area 400 m2
Area 400 m2
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Composting
Equipment
A3, Quantity
ETE CEAGESP
In pond CEPT Design Characteristics
Lagoons meters
Sludge hight 0.4
Water hight 2
Border 0.6
Lagoons
CEPT settling lagoon Number Area total area depth Volume
of lagoons hec hec m m3
1 0.97 0.97 4 38800
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area depth volume depth volume
9700 2.6 25220 0.4 3880
Concrete pile area
Perimeter Width Area
485 2 970
Anaerobic Number Area total area depth Volume
of lagoons hec hec m m3
1 0.64 0.64 4 25600
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area depth volume depth volume
6400 2.6 16640 0.4 2560
Concrete pile area
Perimeter Width Area
443 2 886
Facultative Number Area total area depth Volume
of lagoons hec hec m m3
1 3.31 3.31 3 99300
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area depth volume depth volume
33100 1.6 52960 0.4 13240
Concrete pile area
Perimeter _Width Area
818 2 1636
Total Volume
Soil Managing
Escavation Dredging
area ave. depth volume depth' volume
49,200 1.9 94,820 0.4 19,680
Total concrete pile area 3492
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A3, Quantity
Filling Material
area depth volume
17000 0.5 8500
Diques
Section length volume
37.5 345 12937.5
Regularization 8,500
Total volume required 21437.5
Transportation of fill/borrow material
Sludge Drying Beds
90% of soil movement 110,203 M3XKM
Number Area total area depth Volume
SDB m2 m2 m m3
27 125 3375 4.1 13837.5
Materials
Sand 0.12 405
gravel1&2 0.12 405
grave3&4 0.24 810
grave<4 0.25 843.75
Bricks area 3399
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Al Capital Cost
ITEM SPECIFICATION QUANT UNIT UNIT.PRICE TOTAL PRICE
1 Total ADM/GENERAL FACILITIES R$ 16,926.22
2 Total TECHNICAL SERVICES R$ 8,045.70
3 Total PRELIMINARY SERVICES R$ 74,520.00
SOIL MOVEMENT
MECHANICAL EXCAVATION IN ALL KINDS OF SOIL EXCEPT ROCKS 57484.18 M3 R$ 2.30 R$ 132,213.61
DREDGING 7641.88 M3 R$ 14.04 R$ 107,292.00
FILL MATERIAL 30487.41 M3 R$ 2.64 R$ 80,486.76
TREANCH EXCAVATION
UNTILL 2.00 M DEEP 564.35 M3 R$ 2.68 R$ 1,512.46
FROM 2.00 TILL 4.00 M DEEP 300.60 M3 R$ 3.71 R$ 1,115.23
GREATER THAN 4.00 M -_107.81 M3 R$ 7.82 R$ 843.07
UNCONPACTED FILL MATERIAL 1070.28 M3 R$ 3.39 R$ 3,628.25
COMPACTED MATERIAL
DYKE 26714.67 M3 R$ 2.20 R$ 58,772.27
LOADING / TRANSPORTATION / UNLODING OF MATERIAL
TRANSPORTATION OF FILL/BORROW MATERIAL 141874.00 M3XKM R$ 0.62 R$ 87,961.88
4 Total SOIL MOVEMENT R$ 473,825.53
5 Total DRAINGE & PUMPING R$ 3,581.50
FUNDATIONS & STRUCTURES
CONCERTE PILE (DIAM.=20cm) 960.00 M R$ 18.87 R$ 18,115.20
SUBGRADE
GRAVEL SUBGRADE 1.00 M3 R$ 53.49 R$ 53.49
CONCRETE FORMS
WOODEN FORMS (STANDARD) 64.00 M2 R$ 15.14 R$ 968.96
WOODEN FORMS (STRUCTURAL) 2338.83 M2 R$ 24.99 R$ 58,447.36
REINFORCEMENTS/REBAR
REBAR (CA-50) 13633.87 KG R$ 2.08 R$ 28,358.45
NON ESTRUCTORAL CONCRETE
NON ESTRUCTORAL CONCRETE (MINIMAL CONCENTRATION 150kg of CEMENT/M3) 8.93 M3 R$ 146.84 R$ 1,311.28
ESTRUCTURAL CONCRETE FOR AGRESSIVE INVIRONMENTS
FCK = 20,0 MPA (W/C MAX. 0,50 LIKG MINIMAL CONCENTRATION 350 KG of CIMENT/M3 269.67 M3 R$ 219.19 R$ 59,108.97
LAGOON DEVIECES
PRE CAST CONCRETE SLABS 3609.30 M2 R$ 33.52 R$ 120,983.74
6 Total FUNDATIONS & STRUCTURES R$ 287,347.45
7 Total PIPE INSTALATION R$ 14,059.23
8 Total PAVEMENT R$ 37,995.00
9 Total ALVENARIA R$ 35,458.81
10 Total PAINTING R$ 85,715.79
11 Total URBANIZATON R$ 27,422.46
12 Total GENERAL SERVICES R$ 1,500.00
k)
Al Capital Cost
ITEM SPECIFICATION QUANT UNIT UNIT.PRICE TOTAL PRICE
GENERAL SUPPLIES
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 400MM DIM.) 67.00 M R$ 165.78 R$ 11,107.26
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 500MM DIM.) 213.00 M R$ 225.25 R$ 47,978.25
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 700MM DIM.) 984.00 M R$ 374.24 R$ 368,252.16
HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS SUPPLY (LIST 3) 1.00 GB R$ 865,047.35 R$ 865,047.35
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS SUPPLY (LIST 4) 1.00 GB R$ 50,105.59 R$ 50,105.59
13 Total SUPPLIES R$ 1,342,490.61
14 Total SPECIAL SERVICES R$ 1,270.00
INSTALATIONS
SLUDGE DRYING BADS
SAND 370.80 M3 R$ 59.98 R$ 22,240.58
AGREGATE #1 AND #2 370.80 M3 R$ 47.76 R$ 17,709.41
AGREGATE #3 AND #4 741.60 M3 R$ 47.76 R$ 35,418.82
AGREGATE #4 AND BIGGER 772.51 M3 R$ 77.02 R$ 59,498.72
BRICK (CERAMIC 5X10X20 CM) 3090.00 M2 R$ 3.96 R$ 12,236.40
PUMP BOAT 1.00 GB R$ 200,000.00 R$ 200,000.00
15 Total SLUDGE TREAMENT R$ 347,103.93
HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS INSTALATION (LIST 3 W/T AERATORS) 1.00 GB R$ 86,093.77 R$ 86,093.77
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS INSTALATION (LIST 4) 1.00 GB R$ 12,526.40 R$ 12,526.40
16 Total OTHER R$ 98,620.17
Final Total ETE - CEAGESP (1st STAGE) R$ 2,855,882.39
A2 Capital Cost
ITEM ESPECIFICATION QUANT UNIT UNIT.PRICE TOTAL PRICE
1 Total ADM/GENERAL FACILITIES R$ 16,926.22
2 Total TECHNICAL SERVICES R$ 8,045.70
3 Total PRELIMINARY SERVICES R$ 74,520.00
SOIL MOVEMENT
MECHANICAL EXCAVATION IN ALL KINDS OF SOIL EXCEPT ROCKS 70608.00 M3 R$ 2.30 R$ 162,398.40
DREDGING 15884.00 M3 R$ 14.04 R$ 223,011.36
FILL MATERIAL 27625.00 M3 R$ 2.64 R$ 72,930.00
TREANCH EXCAVATION
UNTILL 2.00 M DEEP 564.35 M3 R$ 2.68 R$ 1,512.46
FROM 2.00 TILL 4.00 M DEEP 300.60 M3 R$ 3.71 R$ 1,115.23
GREATER THAN 4.00 M 107.81 M3 R$ 7.82 R$ 843.07
UNCONPACTED FILL MATERIAL 1070.28 M3 R$ 3.39 R$ 3,628.25
COMPACTED MATERIAL
DYKE 19125.00 M3 R$ 2.20 R$ 42,075.00
LOADING / TRANSPORTATION / UNLODING OF MATERIAL
TRANSPORTATION OF FILUBORROW MATERIAL 121756.54 M3XKM R$ 0.62 R$ 75,489.05
4 Total SOIL MOVEMENT R$_583,002.82
5 Total DRAINGE & PUMPING -$_ 3,581.50
FUNDATIONS & STRUCTURES
CEPT TANK 1.00 R$ 90,000.00 R$ 90,000.00
CONCERTE PILE (DIAM.=20cm) 960.00 M R$ 18.87 R$ 18,115.20
SUBGRADE
GRAVEL SUBGRADE 1.00 M3 R$ 53.49 R$ 53.49
CONCRETE FORMS
WOODEN FORMS (STANDARD) 64.00 M2 R$ 15.14 R$ 968.96
WOODEN FORMS (STRUCTURAL) 2338.83 M2 R$ 24.99 R$ 58,447.36
REINFORCEMENTS/REBAR
REBAR (CA-50) 13633.87 KG R$ 2.08 R$ 28,358.45
NON ESTRUCTORAL CONCRETE
NON ESTRUCTORAL CONCRETE (MINIMAL CONCENTRATION 150kg of CEMENT/M3) 8.93 M3 R$ 146.84 R$ 1,311.28
ESTRUCTURAL CONCRETE FOR AGRESSIVE INVIRONMENTS
FCK = 20,0 MPA (W/C MAX. 0,50 L/KG MINIMAL CONCENTRATION 350 KG of CIMENT/M2 269.67 M3 R$ 219.19 R$ 59,108.97
LAGOON DEVIECES
PRE CAST CONCRETE SLABS 2522.00 M2 R$ 33.52 R$ 84,537.44
6 Total FUNDATIONS & STRUCTURES R$ 340,901.15
7 Total PIPE INSTALATION R$ 14059.23
8 Total PAVEMENT R$ 37,995.00
9 Total MASONRY R$ 35,458.81
10 Total PAINTING R$ 85,715.79
11 Total URBANIZATON R$ 27,422.46
12 Total GENERAL SERVICES R$ 1,500.00
t 3
A2 Capital Cost
ITEM ESPECIFICATION QUANT UNIT UNIT.PRICE TOTAL PRICE
GENERALSUPPLIES ________ ____
NCEPT EQUIPMENTAND FACILITY (LIST 5) 1.00 GB R$ 155,906.00 R$ 155,906.00
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 400MM DIM. _67.00 M R$ 165.78 R$ 11,107.26
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 500MM DIM.) 213.00 M R$ 225.25 R$ 47,978.25
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 700MM DIM.) 984.00 M R$ 374.24 R$ 368,252.16
HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS SUPPLY (LIST 3 W/T AERATORS) 1.00 GB R$ 190,000.00 R$ 190,000.00
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS SUPPLY (LIST 4) 1.00 GB R$ 50,105.59 R$ 50,105.59
13 Total SUPPLIES R$ 823,349.26
14 Total SPECIAL SERVICE R$ 1,270.0
14oa DEWATERING AND COMPOSTING EQUIPMENT AND FACILITY LIST 6) 1.00 GB R$ 320,000.00 R$ 320,000.00
15 Total SLUDGE TREAMENT R$ 320,000.00
HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS INSTALATION (LIST 3 W/T AERATORS) 1.00 GB R$ 19,000.00 R$ 19,000.00
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS INSTALATION (LIST 4) 1.00 GB R$ 12,526.40 R$ 12,526.40
16 Total OTHER R$ 31,526.40
Final Total ETE - CEAGESP (1st STAGE) R$ 2,405,274.34
A3 Capital Cost
ITEM ESPECIFICATION
1 Total ADM/GENERAL FACILITIES
2 Total TECHNICAL SERVICES
3 Total PRELIMINARY SERVICES
SOIL MOVEMENT
MECHANICAL EXCAVATION IN ALL KINDS OF SOIL EXCEPT ROCKS
DREDGING
FILL MATERIAL
TREANCH EXCAVATION
UNTILL 2.00 M DEEP
FROM 2.00 TILL 4.00 M DEEP
GREATER THAN 4.00 M
UNCONPACTED FILL MATERIAL
COMPACTED MATERIAL
DYKE
LOADING / TRANSPORTATION / UNLODING OF MATERIAL
TRANSPORTATION OF FILLIBORROW MATERIAL
SOIL MOVEMENT
DRiAINGE & PUMPING
FUNDATIONS & STRUCTURES
CONCERTE PILE (DIAM.=20cm)
SUBGRADE
GRAVEL SUBGRADE
CONCRETE FORMS
WOODEN FORMS (STANDARD)
WOODEN FORMS (STRUCTURAL)
REINFORCEMENTS/REBAR
REPBAR (C'A-50)
NON ESTRUCTORAL CONCRETE
NON ESTRUCTORAL CONCRETE (MINIMAL CONCENTRATION 150kg of CEMENT/M3)
ESTRUCTURAL CONCRETE FOR AGRESSIVE INVIRONMENTS
FCK = 20,0 MPA (W/C MAX. 0,50 L/KG MINIMAL CONCENTRATION 350 KG of CIMENT/M
QUANT
94820.00.
19680.00
21437.50
564.35
300.60
107.81
1070.28
12937.50
135826.241
960.00
1.00
64.00
2338.83
13633.87
8.93
269.67
UNIT
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3
M3XKM
M
M3
M2
M2
4 Total
5 Total
UNIT.PRICE
R$ 2.30
R$ 14.04
R$ 2.64
R-$2.68
R$ 3.71
R$ 7.82
R$ 3.39
R$ 2.20
R$ 0.62
R$ 18.87
R$ 53.49
R$ 15.14
R$ 24.99
2.08 R$
146.84 R$
219.19 R$
28,358.45
1,311.28
59,108.97|
LAGOON DEVIECES
PRE CAST CONCRETE SLABS 3492.00 M2 R$ 33.52 R$ 117,051.84
6 Total FUNDATIONS & STRUCTURES R$ 283,415.55
7 Total PIPE INSTALATION R$ 14,059.23
8 Total PAVEMENT R$ 37,995.00
9 Total ALVENARIA R$ 35,458.81
10 Total PAINTING R$ 85,715.79
11 Total URBANIZATON R$ 27,422.46
12 Total GENERAL SERVICES R$ 1,500.00
00
KG
M3
M3
TOTAL PRICE
R$ 16,926.22
R$ 8,045.70
R$ 74,520.00
R$ -
R$ 218,086.00
R$ 276,307.20
R$ 56,595.00
R$ 1,512.46
R$ 1,115.23
R$ 843.07
R$ 3,628.25
R$ 28,462.50
R$ 84,212.27
R$ 670,761.97
R$ _ 3,581.50
R$ 18,115.20
R$ 53.49
$ 968.96
R$ 58,447.36
A3 Capital Cost
GENERAL SUPPLIES
CEPT EQUIPMENT AND FACILITY (LIST 5)
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 400MM DIM.)
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 500MM DIM.)
1.00
67.00
213.00
IRON PIPE (PBJE - K7, 700MM DIM.) 984
HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS SUPPLY (LIST 3 W/T AERATORS) 1
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS SUPPLY (LIST 4) 1
SUPPLIES
SPECIAL SERVICES
INSTALATIONS
SLUDGE DRYING BADS
SAND
AGREGATE #1 AND #2
AGREGATE #3 AND #4
AGREGATE #4 AND BIGGER
BRICK (CERAMIC 5X10X20 CM)
PUMP BOAT____________
SLUDGE TREAMENT
HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS INSTALATION (LIST 3 W/T AERATORS)
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS INSTALATION (LIST 4)
OTHER
ETE - CEAGESP (1st STAGE)
.00
.00
.00
405.00
405.00
810.00
843.75
3399.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
GB
M
M
M
GB
GB
M3
M3
M3
M3_
M2
GB
GB
R$ 155,906.00
R$ 165.78
R$ 225.25
R$ 374.24
R$ 190,000.00
R$ 50,105.59
R$ 59.98
R$ 47.76
R$ 47.76
R$ 77.02
R$ 3.96
R$ 200,000.00
R$ 19,000.00
GB R$ 12,526.40
R$ 155,906.00
R$11,107.26
R$ 47,978.25
R$ 368,252.16
R$ 190,000.00
R$ 50,105.59
R$ 823,349.26
R$ 1,270.00
R$ 24,291.90
R$ 19,342.80
R$ 38,685.60
R$ 64,985.63
R$ 13,460.04
R$ 200,000.00
R$ 360,765.97
R$ 19,000.00
R$ 12,526.40
R$ 31,526.40
R$ 2,476,313.86
ITEM I ESPECIFICATION QUANT UNIT I UNIT.PRICE I TOTAL PRICE
13 Total
14 Total
15 Total
16 Total
Final Total
to
O&M (Al)
Unit Quantity Price/unit Total price/month
Pump Boat consumption&maitenance R$/month 1 3000 R$ 3,000.00
Energy consumption of aerators hp 300 R$ 76.67 R$ 23,000.00
Assistants R$/month 2 R$ 1,200.00 R$ 2,400.00
Engineer R$/month 1 R$ 3,000.00 R$ 3,000.00
TOTAL R$ 31,400.00
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O&M (A2)
Flow
Dosage
Hours per day
Price of chemical
Average daily dosage
Price of chemical
Density
161 I/sec
50 mg/I
12 hours
180 US$/ton
25 mg/I
150 R$/ton
1.4 kg/I
(dry basis)
(R$1,2/US$)
Cost
Mass of chemical Volume of chemica price
Kg/day (dry) g/month (di I/day I/month R$ / month
347.76 10432.8 248.4 7452 1564.92
Unit Quantity Price/unit Total price/month
Energy consumption of pumps R$/month 1 R$ 500.00 R$ 500.00
Chemical consumption kg 10432.8 R$ 0.15 R$ 1,564.92
Energy consumptio of dewatering system R$/month 1 R$ 2,000.00 R$ 2,000.00
Composting (tractor maintenance& fuel, operatorand related items) R$/month 1 R$10,000.00 R$ 10,000.00
Pump Boat consumption&maitenance R$/month 1 R$ 3,000.00 R$ 3,000.00
Assistants R$/month 2 R$ 1,200.00 R$ 2,400.00
Engineer R$/month 1 R$ 3,000.00 R$ 3,000.00
TOTAL R$ 22,464.92
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O&M (A3)
Flow
Dosage
Hours per day
Average daily dosage
Price of chemical
Density
161 I/sec
25 mg/I
12 hours
12.5 mg/I
180 R$/ton
1.4 kg/I
(R$1,2/US$)
Cost
Mass of chemical Volume of chemica price
Kg/day (dry) Kg/month (dry) Iday I/month R$ / month
173.88 5216.4 124.2 3726 938.952
Unit Quantity Price/unit Total price/month
Energy consumption of pumps hp 1 R$ 500.00 R$ 500.00
Pump Boat (depretiation, consumption and R$/month 1 R$ 3,000.00 R$ 3,000.00
Chemical consumption kg 5216.4 R$ 0.18 R$ 938.95
Assistants R$/month 2 R$ 1,200.00 R$ 2,400.00
Engineer R$/month 1 R$ 3,000.00 R$ 3,000.00
TOTAL R$ 9,838.95
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List 3
List 3 with aerators.
ITEM
GENERAL EQUIPMENT
AERATORS & RELATED ITEMS
Total
List 3 without aerators.
ITEM
GENERAL EQUIPMENT
Total
QUANT UNIT
1 GB
20 UN
QUANT UNIT
1 GB
UNITPRICE
R$ 103,805.68
R$ 33,736.85
UNIT.PRICE
R$103,805.68
TOTAL PRICE
R$ 190,310.42
R$ 674,736.93
R$ 865,047.35
TOTAL PRICE
R$ 103,805.68
R$ 103,805.68
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List 5
Flow Meter
Item Brazilian Supplier Estimated Cost
ISCO 4210 Ultrasonic Flow Meter Jundilab R$ 3,720.00
for open channel flow Rua Nossa Senhora da Aparecida
Part # 68-4210-001 No. 190 - Vial Rami
13,206,310
Jundiai - SP
tel:55-11-7397-2622
fax:55-11-7397-1362
Two (2) internal 4-20 milliamp signals Jundilab (see above) R$ 660.00
Part# 60-3214-148
Ultrasonic sensor monitoring bracket Jundilab (see above) R$ 24.00
Part # 60-2443-148
Ultrasonic sensor sunshade Jundilab (see above) R$ 42.00
Part # 60-3004-142
120 Volt Hi-Capacity power pack Jundilab (see above) R$ 240.00
Part # 60-1684-088
Chemical Pump
Item Brazilian Supplier Estimated Cost
LMI Series "L" Pump Model #L122-44 Vibropac R$ 5,000.00
Size: 1,680 gallons per day (6,250 L/day) Commercial Equipments Ind. LTDA
Part # 60977 Rua Gal.Eugenio de Melo
85 - Vila Monumento
01553-010
S&o Paulo, SP
tel:55-11-914-8255
fax:55-11-636-888
LMI Pressure Relief Valve for L122 Vibropac (see above) R$ 348.00
1 inch polyproplene (PP)
Part # 60998
LMI Injection Check Valve Assembly Vibropac (see above) R$ 72.00
Part # 26674
Chemical Storage Tank
Item Brazilian Supplier Estimated Cost
15 m3 storage tank, corrosion Interfibra Industrial S A R$ 10,800.00
resistant (no address or telephone number)
(Minimum 7-day storage capacity at a
dose of 50 mg/ primary coagulant)
Storage tanks facility
Item Brazilian Supplier Estimated Cost
Facility (400m2) local contractor R$ 135,000.00
TOTAL LIST 5 R$ 155,906.00
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List 6
Tractor
Item Brazilian Supplier Estimated Cost
Tractor local suppliers R$ 35,000.00
Grade
Container
Related items
Filter press
Item Brazilian Supplier Estimated Cost
Filte press undefined R$ 150,000.00
Filter press facility
Item Brazilian Supplier Estimated Cost
Facility (400m2) local contractor R$ 135,000.00
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Concession
Concession Characteristics
Concession period 10 years
Interest 12.0% /year
Financing period 10 years
Consumers (1992) 49000 consumers
Average flow 0.17 m3/sec
Total flow 5,361,120 m3/year
Price of water 0.5 R$/m3
Wastewater treatment price 0.25 R$/m3
Concessionary percentage 50% 0.125 R$/m4
Population Growth 1.5% /year
Results of Concession Analizys
Al A2 A3
O&M (/year) R$ 376,800.00 R$ 269,579.04 R$ 118,067.42
Capital Cost (CC) R$ 2,855,882.39 R$ 2,405,274.34 R$ 2,476,313.86
Present Value R$4,984,886.43 R$3,928,456.04 R$3,143,421.13
CC amortization R$505,445.96 R$425,695.47 R$438,268.34
Payback Period (years) non payable 12 5
Internal Rate of return (RR) 3% 13% 20%
Present Value of Revenues R$6,180,154.76 R$6,180,154.76 R$6,180,154.76
Benefit Cost Ratio 1.2 1.6 2.0
U)
Al Concession
Yearl Revenues
R$670,140.00
R$680,192.10
R$690,394.98
R$ 700,750.91
R$711,262.17
6 R$721,931.10
7 R$732,760.07
R$743,751.47
O&M
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
9 R$754,907.74 R$376,800.00
10 R$ 766,231.36 R$376,800.00
R$777,724.83
R$789,390.70
R$801,231.56
R$813,250.03
R$ 825,448.79
R$ 837,830.52
R$ 850,397.97
R$ 863,153.94
R$876,101.25
R$889,242.77
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
CC amortization
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
R$505,445.96
Total Cost
R$505,445.96
R$882,245.96
R$882,245.96
R$882,245.96
R$882,245.96
R$882,245.96
R$882,245.96
R$882,245.96
R$882,245.96
R$882,245.96
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
R$376,800.00
NPV
R$ (505,445.96)
R$ (778,205.43)
R$(1,073,643.94)
R$(1,394,332.19)
R$(1,743,147.1 1)
Net Benefit
R$(505,445.96)
R$(212,105.96)
R$(202,053.86)
R$(191,850.98)
R$(181,495.05)
R$(2,123,308.55) R$(170,983.79)
R$(2,538,420.43) R$(160,314.86)
R$(2,992,516.77)
R$(3,490,113.28)
R$(4,036,265.08)
R$(4,131,185.54)
R$(4,226,002.97)
R$(4,320,532.63)
R$(4,414,564.98)
R$(4,507,862.75)
R$(4,600,157.49)
R$(4,691,145.87)
R$(4,780,485.40)
R$(4,867,789.70)
R$(4,952,623.22)
R$(5,034,495.23)
R$(149,485.89)
R$(138,494.49)
R$(127,338.22)
R$ 389,431.36
R$ 400,924.83
R$ 412,590.70
R$ 424,431.56
R$ 436,450.03
R$ 448,648.79
CC+O&M
R$(2,855,882.39)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R-(CC+O&M)
R$(2,855,882.39)
R$ 293,340.00
R$ 303,392.10
R$ 313,594.98
R$ 323,950.91
R$ 334,462.17
R$ 345,131.10
R$ 355,960.07
R$ 366,951.47
R$ 378,107.74
R$ 389,431.36
R$ 400,924.83
R$ (376,800.00)1 R$ 412,590.70
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ 461,030.52 R$ (376,800.00)
R$ 473,597.97
R$ 486,353.94
R$ 499,301.25
R$ 512,442.77
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ (376,800.00)
R$ 424,431.56
R$ 436,450.03
R$ 448,648.79
R$ 461,030.52
ijW
1%
3%
5
6%
7%
8%
9%
9%
473,597.97 [10%
R$ 486,353.94 10%
R$ 499,301.25 11%
R$ 512,442.77 11%
1
2
3
4
5
8
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
,
.
,
A2 Concession
Yearl Revenues 1 O&M
7~L__ 1- ___________
R$ 670,140.00
R$ 680,192. 10
R$690,394.98
R$ 700,750.91
R$711,262.17
R$721,931.10
R$ 732,760.07
R$ 743,751.47
R$ 754,907.74
R$ 766,231.36
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
R$269,579.04
CC amortization
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
R$425,695.47
Total Cost
R$425,695.47
R$695,274.51
R$695,274.51
R$695,274.51
R$695,274.51
R$695,274.51
R$695,274.51
R$695,274.51
R$695,274.51
R$695,274.51
R$269,579.04
NPV
R$ (425,695.47)
R$ (501,913.43)
R$ (577,225.45)
R$ (651,372.03)
R$ (724,060.28)
R$ (794,959.85)
R$ (863,698.44)
R$ (929,856.69)
R$ (992,962.53)
R$(1,052,484.80)
R$ (682,130.66)
Net Benefit
R$(425,695.47)
R$ (25,134.51)
(15,082.41) R$
I R$ (4,879.53) R$
R$ 5,476.40
R$ 15,987.66
R5 26,656.59
R$ 37,485.56
R$ 48,476.96
R$ 59,633.23
R$ 496,652.32
CC+0&M
R$(2,405,274,34)
R$ (269,579.04)
(269,579.04)1 R$
(269,579.04)1 R$
(269,579.04) R$
(269,579.04)]
R$ _(269,579.04)
R$ (269,579.04)
R$ (269,579.04)
R$ (269,579.04)
R$ (269,579.04)
R-(CC+O&M) IRR
R$(2,405,274.34)
R$ 400,560.96
410,613.06
420,815.94
431,171.87
R$ 441,683.13
R$ 452,352.06
R$ 463,181.03
R$ 474,172.43
R$ 485,328.70
R$ 496,652.32
2%
6%
9%
-1I%
13%j
11 R$777,724.83 R$269,579.04 R$269,579.04 R$ (255,840.55) R$ 508,145.79 R$ (269,579.04) R$ 508,145.79 14%
12 R$789,390.70 R$269,579.04 R$269,579.04 R$ 233,270.24 R$ 519,811.66 R$ (269,579.04) R$ 519,811.66 15%
13 R$801,231.56 R$269,579.04 R$269,579.04 R$ 792,915.19 R$ 531,652.52 R$ (269,579.04) R$ 531,652.52 16%
14 R$813,250.03 R$269,579.04 R$269,579.04 R$ 1,431,736.01 R$ 543,670.99 R$ (269,579.04) R$ 543,670.99 16%
15 R$825,448.79 R$269,579.04 R$269,579.04 R$ 2,159,414.08 R$ 555,869.75 R$ (269,579.04) R$ 555,869.75 17%
16- R$837,830.52 R$269,579.04 R$269,579.04 R$ 2,986,795.25 R$ 568,251.48 R$ (269,579.04) R$ 568,251.48 17%
17 R$850,397.97 R$269,579.04 R$269,579.04 R$ 3,926,029.61 R$ 580,818.93 R$ (269,579.04) R$ 580,818.93 17%
2
3
4
5
7 -
8
91
10
00
I
IR$
A3 Concession
Year Revenues O&M CC amortization Total Cost NPV Net Benefit CC+O&M R-(CC+O&M) IRR
R$438,268.34 R$438,268.34 R$ (438,268.34) R$(438,268.34) R$(2,476,313.86) R$(2,476,313.86)
1 R$670,140.00 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ (377,056.30) R$ 113,804.24 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 552,072.58
2 R$680,192.10 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ (298,446.72) R$ 123,856.34 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 562,124.68
3 R$690,394.98 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ (200,201.11) R$ 134,059.22 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 572,327.56
4 R$~700,750.91 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ (79,810.09) R$ 144,415.14 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 582,683.48
5 R$711,262.17 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ 65,539.10 R$ 154,926.41 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 593,194.75 5%
6 R$721,931.10 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ 238,999.14 R$ 165,595.34 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 603,863.68 10%
7 R$732,760.07 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ 444,103.34 R$ 176,424.31 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 614,692.64 14%
8 R$743,751.47 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ 684,811.45 R$ 187,415.71 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 625,684.05 17%
9 R$754,907.74 R$118,067.42 R$438,268.34 R$556,335.76 R$ 965,560.80 R$ 198,571.98 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 636,840.32 18%
10 R$766,231.36 R$118,067.42 R$118,067.42 R$ 1,729,592.03 R$ 648,163.93 R$ (118,067.42) R$ 648,163.93 20%
C*
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